

Chapter 3

The Evolution of Statehood

1. THE BEGINNING OF POLITOGENESIS

We start this chapter with the analysis of macroevolutionary processes that took place during the very prolonged late archaic and early civilization periods. During that period there was outlined the separation of political sphere from society including the beginning of specialization in the field of political management which in fact can be considered as the origin of politogenesis. However, the process of such separation was long-lasting and incomplete; it was finished only during the period of more or less formed statehood. Thus, the politogenesis is much older than the statehood.

We define politogenesis as *a process of formation of a distinct political aspect within the social system that leads to the emergence of partially and relatively autonomous political subsystem, a process of the formation of special power forms of societal organization; this is connected with the concentration of power and political activities (both internal and external) under the control of certain groups and strata.*

Nevertheless, it should not be supposed that politics emerges only with politogenesis. Politics is much older. Politics as a realm of relations concerning the distribution of power (Smelser 1988) seems to have appeared around the age of the Upper Paleolithic Revolution. Actually, certain elements of 'quasipolitical' relationships may be already found among the non-human primates (see, *e.g.*, Dol'nik 2007 on complex and dynamic hierarchical relationships among the baboons; see also, *e.g.*, Butovskaya, Korotayev, and Kazankov 2000). However, among nomadic hunter-gatherers the power systems remained mostly very little differentiated and weakly integrated; on the other hand, the level of their differentiation and integration more or less correlated with their demographic indicators.

The power was mostly based on the age and gender stratification, as well as on the leader's personal qualities and authority, his ability to secure for his community a more or less acceptable life (this was also frequently observed among the early agriculturalists, especially among the semi-nomadic ones [see, *e.g.*, Lévi-Strauss 1955]). However, even among the ethnographically described nomadic hunter-gatherers the important differences in complexity of their socio-political organization were observed. While the majority of the ethnographically described non-specialized nomadic hunter-gatherers were acephalous and egalitarian, some of them (first of all, most of the Australian aboriginal communities) were non-egalitarian (Woodburn 1972, 1979, 1980, 1982, 1988a, 1988b). They demonstrated a sufficiently different type of socio-political organization with a much more structured political leadership concentrated in the hands of hierarchically organized elder males, with a pronounced inequality between males and females, as well as between elder males and younger males.

Among specialized ('higher') hunter-gatherers and fishermen of Siberia, the Far East, Kamchatka, Alaska, the Aleut Isles, North-West and South-West America one could find rather highly structured forms of hierarchical sociopolitical organization that were sometimes even more pronounced than among many early agriculturalists (see, *e.g.*, Townsend 1985; Averkieva 1978; Dauns 1978; Freißen 1961). However, such an evolution was to a certain extent a dead-end as it could have only occurred in especially favourable environments and failed to diffuse to other cultures existing in other environments.

The Agrarian Revolution (or, to be more exact, its first phase connected with the transition to primitive agriculture and animal husbandry [Grinin 2003a, 2006e, 2007b, 2007i, 2007k; Grinin and Korotayev 2009a]) opened a period of deep sociodemographic changes. As regards the subject of the present chapter, it is important to note that the increase in the population and population density (as well as settlement/community sizes) tended to lead to the increase in the significance of political, *i.e.* power, relations both within societies and in intersocietal interaction, including military interaction). Thus already at this macroevolutionary level it appears possible to speak about *protopolitogenesis*.

However, in order that such societies (exemplified in the ethnographic record by most of the traditional sociopolitical systems of New

Guinea) could evolve toward more complex organizational forms, they had (to use Burdeau's [1966] metaphoric expression) to 'cure the power' from the impersonality paralysis of primitive stupor, to develop an institution of chief or its (sometimes democratic) analogues. Hence, the formation of the first polities reaching complexity level of chiefdoms and their analogues was one of the most important macroevolutionary shifts.

Alternative social evolution, uneven rates of change and development of various social subsystems, various combinations of internal and external factors all led to a greater variety of pre-state societal forms and relation types. Among them are: more or less centralized polities headed by a chief appeared, as well as self-governed cities, *poleis*, temple and large rural communities; decentralized chiefless tribes; various complex acephalous sociopolitical systems, *etc.*

Population size of medium-complexity systems can vary greatly from several hundreds to dozens of thousands. However, for more or less centralized or compact entities like simple chiefdoms, small temple-civil communities *etc.* the variation is smaller, from hundreds to thousands. On the whole we rely on Earle's estimates of a chiefdom population within centralized regional structure being in the range of thousands (Earle 1987, 1997, 2011; Johnson and Earle 2000; see also Carneiro, *e.g.*, 1981). However, some chiefdoms with population of thousand or less are known as well, such as typical simple Trobriand chiefdoms (Johnson and Earle 2000: 267–279); chiefdoms in some Polynesian islands (Sahlins 1972a [1958]: 85–87, 188–190) or Cherokee chiefdoms (Service 1975: 140–144 [for more detail concerning the forms and size of pre-state polities see Grinin, Korotayev 2011]).

We tend to speak about the politogenesis proper starting from the level of medium-complexity societies.

However, within most of such social systems the need in systematic professional administration was very weak, or absent, whereas the functions of central power may be performed by various alternative subsystems. It was not infrequent when even irrigation works were conducted independently by village communities without any interference on the part of chiefdom leaders or any other supracommunal rulers (see, *e.g.*, Claessen 2004: 79; see also Leach 1970).

The emergence of chiefdoms usually involved a transition to a higher level of not only political but also general social complexity. And this

puts the given evolutionary type of medium complexity polities in a special position. In some respects, the emergence of chiefdoms can well be regarded as the leading line of politogenesis. However, this can only be done with very serious qualifications. The point is that no political systems developed in isolation, every political system experienced certain transformations under the influence from outside. What is important is that many primary, secondary, and tertiary early states emerged on the basis of various *polis*, civil, temple, civil-temple, trade-craft (and so on) communities, just a fraction of which can be regarded as chiefdoms. Chiefs acted as the leading force of the state formation only in some cases, whereas in the other cases these were some other agents (priests, aristocracy, oligarchic groups, democratic leaders, and so on). As regards the social systems in the medium complexity range, we must note that the urban/communal type of politogenesis was even more ancient than politogenesis through the emergence of chiefdoms (see Korotayev *et al.* 2000; Grinin 2009a, 2009b, 2011a; Grinin and Korotayev 2009a: Ch. 6; 2011; Korotayev and Grinin 2006).

Basing on the aforesaid we believe it makes sense to subdivide all the diversity of the medium complexity polities (in view of a special role played by chiefdoms in the political evolution) into two major types: (1) chiefdoms/chiefdom-like polities and (2) chiefdom analogues.

Chiefdom-like polities can be defined as hierarchically organized and relatively centralized medium complexity polities possessing the following characteristics:

- a) population in the range of several hundred to several thousand;*
- b) political autonomy;*
- c) they are led by a recognized and stable chief/leader or group of leaders who wield power in the framework of certain traditions and procedures; who are able to exercise real control over certain important social relationships and resource flows; who have influential support groups organized around them.*

Chiefdom analogues, that can be defined as polities or territorially organized corporations that have sizes and functions, which are similar to those of chiefdom-like polities, but that lack any of their other characteristics, such as high levels of hierarchy and centralization, presence of formal leader, organized system of resource control,

political independence,¹ and so on (for more detail see Grinin, Korotayev 2011).

Such a subdivision of mid-complexity polities into chiefdoms and their analogues

- emphasizes that chiefdoms are not the only type of mid-complexity polities (yet, in the meantime it indicates their special evolutionary position);
- demonstrates the diversity of evolutionary alternatives to the chiefdoms;
- allows classification of mid-complexity polities that do not fit the chiefdom definition even if there are doubts regarding the exact type of polities to which they belong.

The formation of the first archaic states and their analogues (*i.e.* stateless polities comparable with archaic states – see below) became another extremely important shift.

So during the analyzed late archaic and early civilization periods two major shifts took place, *i.e.*: a) the formation of more or less institutionalized political subsystem, starting from the complexity level of chiefdoms and their analogues; b) the formation of archaic states and their analogues with further institutionalization of the political subsystem.² We have denoted this whole epoch as *the epoch of the initial (or primary) politogenesis* (Grinin 2009h; Grinin and Korotayev 2009c). We define it as ‘initial’ because the politogenesis had not stopped with the state formation, but continued further with the evolution from the early state to the developed one, and even from the developed state to the mature one (see Grinin 2008a, 2010a; Grinin and Korotayev 2006; 2009a: see ch. 5). Respectively, the epoch of primary politogenesis may be subdivided into two epochs: 1) the one starting with the formation of chiefdoms and their analogues, which we denote as the *period of middle-complex societies* or *the pre-state period* (Grinin, Korotayev 2011); 2) the one covering the formation and development of the early states and their analogues, which we denote as the period of complex societies or *early state period* (Grinin 2011a).

¹ This is relevant for such chiefdom analogues as corporations *etc.* (see below).

² Such major macroevolutionary shifts that open a new direction of development to numerous social systems are denoted by us as *social aromorphoses* (for more detail see Grinin, Korotayev 2009a, 2009b, 2009c, 2011).

So the state formation process proper is regarded as a constituent part of the general politogenetic process.

2. ABOUT THE VIEWS ON THE ORIGIN OF STATE

The question about the origin of the state has been highly debated for more than two centuries (for detail see Grinin 2010a, 2011c). Production (Wittfogel 1957), trade (Webb 1975), and military (Carneiro 1970, 1978, 1981, 1987, 2002, 2003) theories are sufficiently popular at present. Elman R. Service's theory of mutual profit (Service 1975) also has its adherents. Service is of the opinion that, owing to the complication of economic and other functions of power, the rulers and the subjects were increasingly interested in mutual services and, hence, gained profit from strengthening power. F. Engels's theory that views the state as a special apparatus of violence to defend the interests of economically dominant classes and suppress exploited classes (Engels 2010 [1884]) is still advocated by many Russian scientists. A number of foreign social scientists also share these ideas (the so-called conflict theory of the origin of the state), although in a significantly modified form. For example, in the opinion of Morton H. Fried (1967), the state originated as a result of a long process of social stratification and the elevated struggle for control and resource distribution. However, all the above theories are open to criticism. The majority of scholars justly tend toward the idea that a combination of different factors (production needs, conflicts between social strata, wars, and many others) was typically present in this highly complicated process. Probably the most reasonable remains Claessen's theory which takes into account several most important factors in their interaction. According to Claessen, to make evolution of early state possible a complex interplay of a number of factors is needed, varying from population growth, the production of a surplus and an ideology which explains and justifies the increasing division of power. Moreover, some incentive seems necessary to trigger the developments (Claessen 2010).³ According to Claessen such triggers include different events (*e.g.*, when

³ In other works Claessen spoke about necessary condition in some different order: societal format, covering the number of people in relation to the means of production and the area of land available, domination and control of the economy, ideology (see Claessen, van de Velde, and Smith 1985; Claessen and van de Velde 1987; Claessen 2000a, 2000b, 2002, 2004); and some trigger event, due to which the process starts up (Claessen 2000b: 155; 2002, 2010).

vital resources control in hands of certain groups makes them masters of the situation; enlargement of the settlements due to threat of attack), but to our mind, here he underestimates somewhat the role of the military factor.⁴

Great difficulties with the analysis of the causes of the emergence of the state appear due to the fact that many researchers implicitly tend to the unilinear evolutionary schemes whereas the evolution should be considered as a multilinear one (for detail see Grinin 2011b, 2011c; Grinin, Korotayev 2009c, 2011; Bondarenko, Grinin, Korotayev 2004, 2011).

The transition to a new level of complexity is inevitably realized in the bundle of models and forms. They can, on the one hand, be considered within a 'horizontal' dimension as equal versions of the same complexity level, and on the other hand, can be analyzed within the evolutionary 'vertical' dimension. So theoretically, one may detect 'main' and 'collateral' development lines of social evolution (see in detail Grinin 2003a, 2004b, 2011b, 2011c). But it took the new organizational principles a rather long time and a few generations of polity types to prove their advantage because possessing an evolutionary potential does not mean to have advantages in a concrete historical situation. Quite often it was just the other way round. Over entire epochs the evolutionary models coexisted and competed with each other (yet being mutually complementary), whereas in particular ecological and social niches some 'collateral' pathways, models, and versions could well have turned out to be more competitive and adequate.

We proceed from the assumption that complex chiefdoms, early states, and different other societal types (large confederations, large self-governed civil and temple communities *etc.*) which will be discussed below, should be considered as standing at the same evolutionary stage, which could be defined as a *complex societies or early-state stage*. The transition to it by definition cannot be fulfilled but in a very extensive variety of forms, developmental trends and combinations.

The answer to the question about the factors that caused the rise of the state depends on what stages of statehood are singled out. In particu-

⁴ In particular, he maintains, that war is considered here as being a derivative of problems in the factors mentioned, rather than a necessary or sufficient factor (Claessen 2010). We think that the war factor is in evidence in virtually every state formation in one form or another; its role can be different (from determinant to essential), but it is never minor (for detail see Grinin 2011b: 78–79; 2011c; Grinin, Korotayev 2009a, 2009c).

lar, many authors deny the existence of a specific stage of early (primitive, archaic) states. In our opinion, such formations can be treated as states; we should bear in mind, however, that they could not have all the characteristics of developed forms and partially preserved pre- or non-state institutions. That was why many of them failed to transfer to a higher stage of development.

In examining the causes and ways of the rise of the state, political anthropologists often miss the following important point: pre-state polities, when uniting (or annexing other polities), could directly transfer to early state organization. However, pre-state sociopolitical systems often developed,; gave rise to nobility, property inequality, and slavery, but failed to become states because they lacked certain political institutions (strong central power, a professional apparatus of control, *etc.*). We term such non-state societies, comparable with states with regard to their complexity and functions performed, as *early state analogues* (for details, see Grinin 2003c, 2007a, 2007b, 2007g, 2007i, 2009h, 2011b, 2011c). Large Gallic polities prior to the conquest of Gaul by Caesar (1st century BC), large nomadic systems (such as the Xiongnu polity in the 2nd century BC or the Scythian 'kingdom' up to the late 5th century BC), and complex chiefdoms on the Hawaiian Islands prior to their discovery by J. Cook in the late 18th century can be attributed to such formations. Some of the early state analogues never became states (*e.g.*, Xiongnu), while others turned into sufficiently developed large, rather than small or medium-sized, states (*e.g.*, the Scythians).

Two main models of transitioning to the state may be justly singled out. According to the first one, states were forming 'vertically', so to speak, *i.e.*, from non-state societies directly to states. For example, in Ancient Greece, people often had to migrate from villages to one large settlement to protect themselves from military actions or pirates; such migrations are called synoecism (Gluskina 1983). Sometimes, large states were formed 'vertically' at once, as was the case with the Zulus who rapidly created a sufficiently large state under the rule of 'Emperor' Shaka in the south of Africa in the early 19th century from a diversity of small individual chiefdoms (Ritter 1990).

The second way is 'horizontal'. At first, pre-state societies transfer to a new stage of development (exceptionally in the form of early state analogues) and then transform into states.




Fig. 3. Two models of transition to the early state

However, the inner maturity of society, sufficient surplus production, social stratification, and so on are not enough to form a state. Special circumstances are necessary because transition to the state system is usually associated with sharp changes in social and political life under any model. In our opinion, this transition is facilitated by serious shifts from the habitual situation, such as the cessation of isolation, the emergence of a real threat to society or a part of the population, a sharp rise in trade, internal conflicts, and so on. All this can stimulate substantial changes in management and the political structure (for details, see Grinin 2003c, 2007a, 2007b, 2007g, 2007i, 2009h, 2011a, 2011b, 2011c; Grinin, Korotayev 2009b, 2009c). In addition, we believe that wars, conquests, borrowing more effective weapons, and the threat of being conquered are, no doubt, of paramount importance among the factors that cause sharp changes in life conditions. For example, importing firearms was an important factor in the formation of certain states, for example, on Madagascar in the 17th century or on the Hawaiian Islands in the late 18th and early 19th centuries (the fact that the islands ceased to be isolated also played an important role here).

3. ON THE TYPOLOGY OF THE EARLY STATES

As process of politogenesis should not be reduced only to the state formation so the early states themselves cannot be reduced only to a single type, namely, the bureaucratic one. The diversity of political evolution

is expressed, in particular, in the variety of early states proper among which the bureaucratic states represent just only a type. Thus, it is right-ful to speak about many types of early states (see also Grinin 2001–2006, 2004a, 2004c, 2007h, 2011b). For the definition of the **early state** see below.

For example, Old Russia and Norway (as well as Lithuania in the 13th–14th centuries and some other early states) provide examples of the **druzhina** type where power of the ruler ‘was measured primarily by the number of his armed followers’ (Gurevich 1980: 131). The *druzhina* (prince’s armed forces or retinue) was formed of the prince’s closest supporters who helped him to rule the army and the principdom (Gurevich 1970: 173; Shmurlo 2000: 107). As concerns Sparta, *e.g.*, Finley indicated it as a model military state. But according to him, the paradox is that Sparta’s greatest military success destroyed the model (Finley 1983: 40). However, besides Sparta many other ancient states were military but with different peculiarities. That is why in my opinion it is more correct to regard Sparta as a military slave-holding and communal state. We can also speak about **military-trading** states, particularly in regard to the nomadic ones (like the Khazar [Pletnyova 1986, 1987: 206–207; Shmurlo 2000: 38; Khazanov 2008] and Turk [Gumilev 1993: 42] Khaganats). A number of medieval European states, Moscow Russia in the 15th – the early 16th centuries, the early Ottoman Empire as well as its predecessor in Asia Minor in the 11th – 13th centuries, the Seljuqid state were nothing but **military-servant** (military-feudal) states (Gordlevsky 1941: 69; Petrosyan 1990: 91; Stroyeva 1978: 5–11), *etc.* One can also speak about **imperial non-bureaucratic** states like the Aztec state (Johnson and Earle 2000: 306); **predatory** states (like ancient Assyria).

The *polis* and *civitas* (although sharing many features) **each represents a specific type of the early state**. Probably it can explain why their evolutionary potentials turned out to be different. The Roman Republic, though not without crises, transformed into a more developed type of state. But the same transformation turned out to be impossible for a small democratic *polis* though a certain evolution took place there in the 3rd – 2nd centuries BCE (see Sizov 1992: 72–73).

Yet, the early democratic states are not at all peculiar for the European Antiquity only. They were present in different parts of the world. In particular, in Northern India in ancient times (the 6th–3rd centuries BCE) a number of republics existed; they possessed different types of gov-

ernment but still the population or aristocratic council elected the governors there. Furthermore, the republics struggled with monarchies and more than once won impressive victories. Among 'great countries' the Buddhist sources mentioned also some republic states (Bongard-Levin 1979; Bongard-Levin and Ilyin 1969: 91–94; Mishra P. and Mishra J. 2002).

4. ON THE NECESSITY OF CHANGE IN THE CONCEPT OF EVOLUTIONARY STAGES OF STATEHOOD

Unfortunately, little attention is paid in political anthropology to the subject of the evolutionary succession of statehood stages (Grinin 2008e, 2011b). The model developed by Claessen and Skalnik, who singled out the two main stage types of statehood, the *early* state and the *mature* state (Claessen 1978), has been the most popular over the last two to three decades. The concept of the early state introduced by Henri J. M. Claessen and Peter Skalník appears to have been the last among the great epoch-making political-anthropological theories of the 60s and 70s of the last century (e.g., Sahlins [1960, 1963, 1968], Service [1962, 1975], Fried [1967, 1975]), which did more than just giving a new consideration of socio-political evolution, its stages and models. One may even say that these theories succeeded in filling the evolutionary gap between the pre-state forms and the state, which had formed by that moment in the academic consciousness due to the fact that the accumulated ethnographic and archaeological data could hardly fit the prior schemes.

However, it seems that in comparison with other 'stage' theories from the above-mentioned list the theory of the early state has a number of important advantages, especially concerning the view on social evolution in general and the evolution of statehood in particular. No wonder that Joyce Marcus and Gary Feinman (1998: 6) mention Claessen and Skalník among such scholars who do not believe in inevitability; they know that not every autonomous village society gave rise to a chiefdom, nor did every group of chiefdoms give rise to a state (see also Grinin 2007i).

In the theory of the early state it was fundamentally new and important from a methodological point of view to define the early state as a separate stage of evolution essentially different from the following stage, the one of the full-grown or mature state. 'To reach the early state

level is one thing, to develop into a full-blown, or *mature* state is quite another' (Claessen and Skalník 1978b: 22). At the same time they (as well as a number of other authors) indicated quite soundly that not all early states were able to become and actually became mature ones (see, e.g., Claessen and Skalník 1978a; Claessen and van de Velde 1987; Shifferd 1987). Thus there was formed exactly an evolutionary sequence of statehood in the form of a two-stage scheme: the early state – the mature state. And that explained a lot in the mechanisms and directions of the political evolution. However, the former of these two stages of the evolution of statehood (the early state) has been studied rather thoroughly, whereas the latter (the mature state) has not become the subject of a similarly close examination. Unfortunately, the analysis of the mature state has been little advanced in those several contributions to the subsequent volumes of the Early State project (further referred to as Project) where the subject was touched upon. Below we will present our own approach to the distinction of the stages of the evolution of statehood which to our mind develops and supplements Claessen – Skalník's ideas on the subject. However, this has made it necessary to suggest new formulations of the main characteristics of each stage of the evolution of the state.

The fact is when we try to apply the scheme 'early *state* – mature *state*' to the political development of the humankind it becomes evident that this scheme is in no way complete.

Firstly, if, according to the prevalent views, the first mature states appeared in ancient times (Egypt), or in the late 1st millennium BCE (China),⁵ how could we classify the European states of the 18th and 19th centuries, let alone the contemporary states? Would they be also mature, or supermature?

Secondly, it is also obvious that the European 19th century states also differed in the most profound way from the complex politically centralized monarchies of the Antiquity and Middle Ages (which themselves are qualitatively more complex than the early state) according to a number of other characteristics (in particular, with respect to the administration level and culture, in the degree of development of the law, and the relationships between the state and society).

⁵ For example, in the *Early State* (Claessen and Skalník 1978d) contributions dealing with Egypt and China (Janssen 1978: 213; Pokora 1978: 198–199), the period of the early state corresponds to the Ancient Kingdom (up to 2150 BCE), whereas for China it is regarded as the period preceding the formation of the Qin Empire (up to 221 BCE).

Finally, it would be at least strange to assume that modernization in general and the industrial revolution of the 18th–19th centuries in particular did not cause significant changes in state organization. Meanwhile, the above-mentioned theory does not assume the possibility of these changes at all.

So the sequence of two stages of the evolution of statehood must be re-examined and changed. Hence we think that it would be more correct to distinguish not two but three stages of statehood, namely after the stage called by Claessen and Skalník the ‘mature state’ there must be inserted one more stage which would denote the type of industrial states (not only European but all the industrial states). However, here comes the problem of the name of this third stage. It would be better to introduce a new term for it. But which term? Supermature would sound awkward. So we came to the conclusion to keep the term mature state only for the industrial states and to define as **developed** states those pre-industrial bureaucratic centralized states that Claessen, Skalník and others call the ‘mature’ ones (see Grinin 2006d, 2006g, 2007a, 2008a, 2011b; Grinin and Korotayev 2006, 2009a). Hence, we are dealing not with the two main stages of statehood development (the early states and the mature states), but with the following sequence of **three** stages: **early states; developed states; mature states**.

This has made it necessary to develop anew the statehood evolution theory and to suggest new formulations of the main characteristics of each of the stages of this evolutionary process.

For each stage we can identify three phases: the *primitive, typical, and transitional states of each respective type*.⁶ In the framework of this chapter the basic characteristics of statehood stages are identified on the basis of the middle phase of each stage (thus, respectively for *typical* early, *typical* developed, and *typical* mature states). The point is that at the first phase (the one of the *primitive* state of the respective type) the polity retains many

⁶ In general, these names are given to the respective phases in accordance with the tradition of Claessen and Skalník (1978b: 22–23; 1978c: 640; Claessen 1978: 589) who identified the inchoate, typical, and transitional stages of the early state. However, there are certain problems when we deal with a regression from a developed to a primitive phase of certain types of statehood. For example, to denote the 18th century developed state in Egypt (after it had regressed from the typical developed statehood found there, e.g., in the 16th or 11th centuries) as ‘inchoate’ appears to be clearly misleading (see, e.g., Grinin 2006e). Hence, the term ‘primitive’ seems to be more appropriate here.

elements of the previous state type, whereas in the third phase (the *transitional* phase) many of its institutions become 'overripe' and the first characteristics of a higher stage of the statehood development appear.

Further we will briefly study the main differences between three evolutionary types of state and then examine every type in detail. With such a composition of the chapter the repetitions are inevitable but since the readers are suggested a new theory such iterations are quite justified.

5. MAIN DIFFERENCES OF THE EARLY, DEVELOPED, AND MATURE STATES

Early states are insufficiently centralized states. They politically organize societies with underdeveloped administrative-political and with no clear-cut social and class structures.

Early states differ greatly from each other in many characteristics in particular with respect to the degree of their centralization, as well as the level of development of their administrative, taxation, judicial systems and so on. However, if we try to understand what differentiates early states from the developed and mature ones, we find that early states are always incomplete states (**both organizationally and socially**). This 'incompleteness' is also relevant with respect to relationships between the state and the society. Let us see what is meant.

There were numerous versions of early states, but within each of them some important elements of statehood were either absent, or significantly underdeveloped. In most cases this incompleteness was expressed in the most direct way, as most of the early states simply did not have the minimal necessary level of centralization or/and some significant statehood attributes, or did not develop them to a sufficient degree. Early states often lacked a complete set or a satisfactorily developed set of power attributes that later became universal, such as a professional administrative apparatus, a system of regular taxation, administrative territorial division, written law, and sufficient centralization. Organizational and administrative institutions of early states were quite specific. For example, militia or feudal levy instead of regular army, landowners who performed the functions of both administrators and landlords instead of professional state officials and judges, a conglomerate of individual areas with their individual forms of power instead of a clear divi-

sion into provinces, incomes from the king's domain instead of taxation, and so on.

It is very important to understand, *that professional apparatus, taxation system, and territorial division are optional for early states; they become obligatory only for the next evolutionary type, the developed state.*

But this 'incompleteness' of early states is also relevant with respect to the relations between the state and the society. However, in some early states (such as, *e.g.*, the state of the Incas or the Early Kingdom in Egypt) a contrary disproportion is observed. Though the administrative apparatus and bureaucracy were rather powerful there, they were imposed upon societies that were underdeveloped socially and/or ethnically. Hence, in such cases it was the *society* that looked underdeveloped in comparison with the state.

Developed states are fully formed centralized states of the Late Antiquity, the Middle Ages, and the Early Modern period. They politically organize societies with distinct estate-class stratification.

The developed state is a state that has been formed and is inevitably completed. So that is why the attributes of statehood that could be absent within the political system of the early state – such as a professional apparatus of administration, control and suppression, a system of regular taxation, an administrative territorial division, and written law – are necessarily present within that of the developed one.⁷ The developed state was an outcome of a long historical development and selection, as a result of which those states turn out to be more successful whose institutes are organically linked with the social structures of respective societies that are both grounded on the respective social order and support it. The developed state affects social processes in a much more purposeful and active way. It is not only closely connected with the peculiarities of the social and corporate structure of the society, but also constructs them in political and judicial institutions. In this respect it can be regarded as an estate-corporate state.

⁷ Naturally, the notion of '*developed*' state is rather conventional. It can only be regarded as developed in comparison with the less complex ('early') state, whereas it appears underdeveloped when compared with the more complex ('mature') statehood. Thus, the Russian state in the age of Ivan the Terrible appears rather developed when compared with the Muscovy Principedom of Ivan Kalita and his successors. However, it does not stand any comparison even with the empire of Peter the Great. However, Peter I's state looks rather primitive in comparison with, say, the Russian Empire in the late 19th century.

Mature states are the states of the industrial epoch. It is a result of modernization, development of capitalism and the industrial (as well as demographic) revolution; hence, it has a qualitatively different production basis and social structure. Thus, according to this point of view, in the Antiquity and Middle Ages there were no mature states, but only early and developed ones.

Mature states politically organize societies, where estates have disappeared, the industrial classes (bourgeois and employees or the analogous groups of the socialist *nomenklatura* and employees) have formed, nations have developed and nation-state formed, and representative democracy or one-party state have proliferated.⁸

The mature state greatly differs from its precursors. Organizationally and legally, it significantly surpasses the developed state: it has qualitatively more developed and specialized institutions of management and an apparatus of suppression and control. The state apparatus and army become autonomous to a certain degree and play an increasingly clear role of an abstract mechanism of serving society. There are also a clear-cut mechanism and a written procedure for the legitimate transfer of power (absent in many developed states).⁹ As a rule, constitutions and systems of power division are created, and the role of law, especially civil law, increases. On the whole (except for some totalitarian and authoritarian states), the systems of law and legal proceedings reach quite a high level in mature states. The most important function of this type of state is ensuring not only social order but also the everyday legal order.

6. EARLY STATE

First of all, let me introduce our definition. **The early state** is a category used to designate a special form of political organization of a relatively large and complex agrarian society (or a group of societies/territories) that determines its external policy and partly its social order; it is a power organization (a) that possesses supremacy and sovereignty (or, at least, autonomy); b) that is able to coerce the ruled to fulfil its demands; to alter important relationships and to introduce new norms,

⁸ On totalitarian mature states see Grinin 2007a: 274, 279–280.

⁹ This was also related both to the rules of the succession to throne whose absence often caused violent struggle for the throne among the heirs in the developed states, as well as the election rules to the representative institutions.

as well as to redistribute resources; c) that is based (entirely or mostly) on such principles that are different from the kinship ones. Once again we point out, this definition does not mention professional administrative and control apparatus, regular taxation and artificial territorial division as necessary traits of the early state because in the early states those traits are almost never observed in their entirety.

The state as a form of political organization of the society reflects the social construction of the latter. Our analysis of the traits typical for the early state indicates that this state should be regarded as **incomplete**. This *incompleteness* implies that there are certain restrictions within the system of relationships between the state and society that block the further development of the early state. These restrictions mean that *such a relationship between the state and society is retrospectively (from the point of view of the evolutionary potential of the respective system) inadequate in comparison with what we observe within more developed systems*. Thus, it is in no way strange (what is more, it is perfectly normal) that most early states never evolved into developed states (see, e.g., Claessen, van de Velde 1987; 1991; Skalník 1996; Shifferd 1987; Tymowski 1987; Kochakova 1995), whereas those that did it, usually only achieved this through painful crises and cataclysms that caused a deep reconstruction of the entire system.

The restrictions manifest themselves in different ways. Sometimes the political form of the early state turned out to be insufficiently tightly connected with the society. In such cases it did not 'matter' (for a state superstructure) what it controlled. Take, for example, Central Asia where interstate borders did not get stabilized for centuries, they changed constantly in connection with purely military circumstances and a new conqueror's luck (this is also rather typical for West Asia and North Africa). As another example, one can take Medieval Europe during the 11th – 13th centuries, where huge areas were transferred from one ruler to another, and from one polity to another as a result of rulers' marriages/divorces, deaths and inheritance cases.¹⁰

¹⁰ Suffice to mention just one example. In the 12th century the French King Louis VII obtained the largest (within France) Duchy of Aquitaine and the County of Poitou through a dynastic marriage to Eleanor of Aquitaine. However, he lost them rather soon as a result of his divorce with Eleanor. A few months later she married Henry Plantagenet (Count of Anjou who also controlled within France the Duchy of Normandy, as well as the Counties of Touraine and Maine). Consequently, Aquitaine fell under Henry's control. The further development of events was even more interesting.

Europe at this time is an example of a political system with a weak administrative structure. However, we also find such cases of ‘incongruence’ between the state and society when the political system of a state possesses a developed administrative apparatus that is able to control and regulate different territories. This could be observed in Mesopotamia where states frequently changed their borders, grew and shrank in a rather fast way, which was accompanied by a fast dynastic change. However, the principles of statehood remained the same as the bureaucracy easily imposed itself over any territorial configurations.

However, in some early states the above mentioned limitations expressed themselves in the fact that the links between the state and society were too tight, that is, some state form was appropriate only for a given society. As a result such states were incapable of performing qualitative transformations. A good example is provided here by the organization of the Greek *poleis* that failed to transform themselves even when their independence was threatened. ‘A paradox of Greek history is that its main tendency was the continuous and generally unsuccessful aspiration to overcome the *polis*: it was continuous because of the incongruence of sometime established *polis* principles... with the subsequent social progress, whereas it was unsuccessful because the attempts to overcome the *polis* were undertaken on the very basis of the *polis*’ (Frolov 1979: 6).

We have identified the two main types of incongruence between the political and structures of the ancient and medieval states.

The first and the most wide-spread incongruence is when the administrative structure of the state is underdeveloped. As was mentioned above, early states did not possess the complete set of important features of the developed state, or had not developed all (or some) of them up to a sufficient degree. In fact, some of these features could be rather developed, whereas the rest were underdeveloped (and some could just be absent). First of all, this is relevant for such statehood attributes as: (1) a professional administration/control/oppression apparatus; (2) taxation; (3) administrative (*i.e.* made specially for the purpose of governing) territorial division; and (4) the presence of written law

Since the conquest of England by William, the Duke of Normandy, the kinship networks of the English and French nobility got intertwined very tightly, which led to Henry's becoming the King of England. Consequently, all the above mentioned French territories (stretching from the English Channel to the Pyrenees and exceeding the size of the royal domain of the King of France) fell under the control of the King of England (who still remained formally a vassal of the King of France) (see, *e.g.*, Kirillova 1980: 216–217; Kolesnitsky 1980: 194; Lyublinskaya 1972: 97).

and written administrative documentation (orders, directives, reports, archives, *etc.*).

Frequently early states had a rather weak apparatus of administration and oppression. Sometimes this weakness was combined with a primitive character of social stratification, as, for example, could be observed in the European 'barbarian kingdoms' of the early Middle Ages. On the other hand, estate-class stratification could be expressed in a rather distinct way, whereas the administrative apparatus was weak and non-bureaucratic, as could be found in Athens, Rome and other states where professional administrators were either absent all together (and magistrates occupied their positions in turn or by drawing lots), or they did not receive salaries and were elected for short periods of time (see, *e.g.*, Osborne 1985: 9; Finley 1977: 75; Shtaerman 1989; Grinin 2004c, 2004e, 2008f, 2010a). It was not always the case (especially in the Ancient period) that early states had regular armies, whereas rulers relied on levies as their main military force. Also, police systems were seldom found in these early states.¹¹

In some early states we find tribute, gifts, temporary loans rather than true regular taxation, *etc.* Frequently taxes were irregular; for example, often they were only collected during wars. In some cases they could be absent all together, as the government could have other sources of revenue, such as monopolies on some types of trade (including foreign trade), or some types of economic activities (*e.g.*, extraction of salt and other minerals), special lands and territories whose revenues were used to support the ruler (thus, in medieval Europe revenues of the royal domain were frequently the main source of the state finance); tribute and contributions paid by subjugated areas; compulsory payments of allies (as, *e.g.*, within the Athenian *arche*) and so on. In the early Roman Republic a very important source of public financing consisted of revenues from the public lands that were rented out, whereas taxes were only collected in extraordinary circumstances (see, *e.g.*, Petrushevsky 2003 [1917]: 86).¹²

¹¹ It is not surprising that with respect to the early states the data on the presence of police forces are extremely scarce. For example, among two dozen early states surveyed by Claessen (Claessen 1978: 560) he only managed to find some evidence of the presence of police systems in four cases.

¹² A rather telling statement is made by Trouwborst (1987: 136) who notes that the states of the African Great Lakes region did not create a full-fledged taxation system and adds that if they had created it, this could have been the *end* of the early state.

In some early states we find natural rather than administrative territorial divisions, or such divisions as based on clans, tribes, or local communities (see, *e.g.*, Korotayev 1995, 1996; Grinin 2006g, 2007a).¹³

Such incomplete early states were often just imposed over societies and restricted themselves to military and redistribution tasks, collection of tribute and duties without penetrating deeply into social life.¹⁴ Ancient Russia was such a state for a rather long period of time as well as many states created by nomads, many early states of Tropical Africa and so on. It was not rare when a young state nourished a vigorous layer of new nobility that stopped taking into account the interests of the very state that had created it and began to shape social processes of their own. A clear example is provided here by the titled nobility of medieval Europe that transformed service fiefs into private property, enslaved peasants, stripped the kings of their tax-payers and soldiers, and finally transformed kingdoms into nominal entities. Similar processes could be observed during certain periods in many other countries' history starting from rather ancient epochs (*e.g.*, in China of the Chou period: Vasilyev 1993: 187–189; see also Kryukov 1974: 14–15; Kril 2001).

The process described above is the representative of the *typical* early state phase and turned out to be a period of feudal decentralization. That is why the following statement makes sense: 'Political decentralization of the early feudal epoch is not a symptom of the state's weakness, but a natural condition (within the observed circumstances): this was a hierarchicized alliance of vassals and seniors based on a system of personal links that were the prevalent form of social relations in this society' (Gurevich 1970: 60).

In small (and to some extent in medium-size) states the administrative apparatus was usually underdeveloped and insufficiently separated from the population due to their sizes. Indeed, within such a scale many problems can be solved in a rather effective way by means that are different from state orders and controls (they could be solved, *e.g.*, by private persons, through the direct expression of the population's will, or through the activities of clans, professional organizations and social groups). Here the growth of statehood was connected first of all with

¹³ Many examples of this can be found in Tropical Africa (see, *e.g.*, Kubbel' 1988: 132, *etc.*).

¹⁴ Not surprising the social stratification in the early states quite often is not sufficiently pronounced (see, *e.g.*, Maretina 1987; see also Kubbel' 1973: 232; Tomanovskaya 1973: 280).

the necessity to wage successful wars, and sometimes to organize foreign trade. An important role could be played by the state in the settlement of social conflicts, as this was observed in Athens, some other Greek *poleis*, and to some extent in early Rome (with respect to the conflict between plebeians and patricians). As a result of such conditions, some features of statehood were strengthened and others lagged behind. The particulars depended on the peculiarities of concrete polities. Spartan, Athenian, Phoenician (as well as Roman and Carthaginian [naturally until the respective polities remained small]) ways are just some versions of such development.

On the other hand, large early states of the imperial type that originated as a result of conquests were bound to disintegrate or to get radically reduced in size. Empires rarely remained powerful for more than 100 consecutive years (see, *e.g.*, Taagapera 1968, 1978a, 1978b, 1979). Numerous rises and falls of Assyria in the 13th – 7th centuries BCE can serve here as a clear example (see, *e.g.*, Sadayev 1979). However, even when an early state was militarily strong enough to keep its provinces under control for long periods of time, still it usually turned out to be insufficiently developed to integrate effectively its constituent parts. There was usually a pronounced imbalance between the statehood of the center and its periphery (see, *e.g.*, Thapar 1981: 411). As a rule a typical early empire was a *multipolity*, that is, a political system consisting of a state in its center and various non-state polities at its periphery (see, *e.g.*, Korotayev *et al.* 2000: 23–24; Grinin, Korotayev 2006: 79–80; 2009a). And such states as republics of Rome, or Carthage or Mauryan Empire in India in the 4th century BCE, and moreover Charlesmagne's Empire, Grand Duchy of Lithuania of the 14th century and many other large states were not tightly integrated systems, but rather conglomerates of territorial polities (for more detail see Grinin 2007a: 134–135). They possessed systems of special links between the center and every people, every region, every territory, whereas some peoples/communities had more rights, some others had fewer rights, some were almost equal to the center, and some had an extremely low status.

The second kind of incompleteness of the early state was opposite to the first and by far less frequent one. We are referring to those states that possessed a developed bureaucratic administrative apparatus

while, at the same time, had an underdeveloped social structure. Such states lacked sufficiently distinct forms of social stratification (that is, they did not have clearly expressed classes or estates, and lacked sufficiently mature land property relations). What is more, an overdeveloped administrative apparatus could block the formation of a sufficiently developed and stable social system.

Examples of the similar situation are: Egypt of the Ancient Kingdom; the Inca Empire; Sumer of the Third Dynasty of Ur (the 21st century BCE); and the subsequent state of Hammurabi.¹⁵ Thus, one may say that in such states bureaucracy (notwithstanding all its organizational importance) was an external superstructure over society. In other early states, military nobility with its retinues was imposed over society. However, these elites possessed different methods for exploiting and influencing the society (see Grinin 2007a for more detail).

If in the former case of incompleteness the early state's weak governments sometimes failed to sufficiently mobilize country's resources as they dealt with self-willed nobility and local governors; in the latter case, the state suppressed the society by trying to restructure it entirely to meet the needs of the state. It took upon itself the functions of resource redistribution and production organizer/controller. Such a state's hypertrophy developed under conditions of a subsistence economy (as was observed, *e.g.*, in the Inca Empire). However, an obsession with registration and control could also be found in societies with commodity-market relations if state duties in kind were also prevalent there; for example, the collection, transportation, storage, and redistribution of duties kind are much more arduous and cumbersome than the accumulation of money.

However, the overdevelopment of the bureaucratic administrative apparatus within the state of the Third Dynasty of Ur and the kingdom of Hammurabi sharply distinguished them from the rest of archaic states. Hence, though, on the one hand, these states could be considered early states, on the other, they could also be regarded as developed state analogues (we have taken both these points into account in Table 5).

¹⁵ See on the Inca Empire: Berezkin 1991; Zubritskiy 1966, 1975; Inca Garsilaso 1974; Kuzmischev 1974; Mason 1957; Schaedel 1978; on Ancient Egypt: Perepyolkin 1988, 2001; Vinogradov 2000a; Zablotska 1989; Brested, Turayev 2003; Zhak 1992; on Mesopotamia: Dyakonov 1983: 370; Zablotska 1989; Kozyreva 2000: 83; Oppenheim 1990: 66, 67.

7. DEVELOPED STATE

First of all, it is necessary to note that the developed state is more organic for society; to be more exact, the state becomes its natural political form, though the fitting process could proceed painfully and turbulently. The road to the developed state was lengthy and complicated as the developed state was the result of numerous transformations, upheavals, splits and reintegrations; within these processes there was a natural selection leading to more effective types of interaction between the state and social/ethnic structures. Significant progress in state political, administrative and legal arrangements as well as ideology was needed so that the developed state could appear. On the other hand, a certain level of ethnic, social, economic, and cultural development was necessary as a result of which society becomes sufficiently consolidated socially and ethnically. It is rather essential that the developed state is not only tightly connected with the society's social and corporative structure and formalizes them in political institutions, but that it also influences them much more purposefully and actively.

The developed state is centralized and complete, *i.e.* many features that could be absent in the early states, are necessarily present in the developed states. Such a state is formed as a result of a long period of development of administration techniques, expansion and professionalization of administrative structures, and the coordination of the state agencies to perform their various designated tasks. Hence, **the developed state is a category that denotes a natural form of political organization of a civilized society (or a group of such societies) that is characterized by a centralized organization of power, administration, coercion and order maintenance in the form of a system of special institutions, positions (titles), organs, laws (norms) and that possesses (a) sovereignty; (b) supremacy, legitimacy and reality of power within a certain territory and a certain circle of people; and (c) has the capability to change relations and norms.**

We have formulated here the *minimum* characteristics of the developed state that distinguish it from the early state:

a) **The developed state has more statehood attributes which in addition are more elaborated.** The developed state possesses all the statehood features mentioned below in a rather clear and systematic form: a special professional administration/coercion apparatus sepa-

rated from the population; regular taxation; and an artificial territorial division. Also it always has a written law and a special culture of written documentation, registration, and control.¹⁶ Such a state cannot rely on levies and has a regular professional standing army. Archaic duties and revenues (tribute, gifts, labour-rents, revenues from state-sponsored plundering and contributions) disappear, or play subordinate roles. Taxation becomes more regular and ordered.

b) **The developed state is an estate-corporative state.** The social structure of the developed state becomes represented by large social groups and not by numerous tiny social layers or socio-territorial units (like autonomous cities or temples with special privileges) which are found in early states. Large ethnic groups develop instead of conglomerates of tribes and small peoples. As a result, society becomes socially quite consolidated. The estate consolidation is connected with a decline in the isolation of areas and territories, with economic unification of the society, and with more intensive contacts within the elites representing different parts of a country. With respect to states one cannot help but notice that the activities of a developed state are directed toward the legal shaping of estates, at making the society more stable, at ordering social mobility. On the other hand, both the state structure and its policies reflect the peculiarities of its social (and ethnic) arrangement; the state actively influences the social structure of society and acts as an intermediary between various estates/corporations. We can frequently observe a process of more distinct shaping of the system of titles and officials' ranks (in the latter case it is especially relevant when the ruling class is identical with the officials' corporation (what is denoted as 'state-class' by Cheshkov [1967: 243–245]).

c) **The developed state is always a centralized state; generally, it is much more durable and stable than the early state.** The developed state cannot be a political conglomerate, as was frequently the case with respect to early states. This is not just a set of territories that disintegrate as soon as the central power weakens. Of course, disintegration can be experienced by the developed states rather regularly (especially, during the transition from primitive to typical developed statehood¹⁷). However,

¹⁶ Note that it was not infrequent when in the early states (even when the writing was available) not all the state acts were written. Many (and sometimes most) acts remained oral. For example, according to Jacques Le Goff (1992: 45), this was the case in the Charlemagne's empire.

¹⁷ They were also regularly observed at the end of political-demographic cycles because the pre-industrial socio-demographic cycles usually ended with a political-demographic collapse, after

if the development of such a state continues, it is always connected with a new and tighter form of centralization within more or less the same territory. This is accounted for by the fact that the developed state is formed within a definite, historically prepared (both materially and culturally) territory with a common culture, ideology, and writing, and is supported by the development of communications, trade, a certain unification of money types, measures, law, and so on.¹⁸ Hence, the higher is the level of statehood development, the more stable it is with respect to the destabilizing influence of various crises, and the faster is its transition to the recovery growth phase.¹⁹

d) **The developed state is characterized by a more developed economic base.** In particular, unlike the early state, the developed state cannot be formed without cereal production (let alone the fact that it cannot develop on the basis of animal husbandry), whereas some early states (first of all in Tropical Africa) were formed on the basis of such agriculture domesticates as yams, bananas, manioc, peanuts *etc.* (see, *e.g.*, Bondarenko 1995: 103). The developed state cannot fail to possess an internal market, it cannot be based on subsistence economy, unlike some early states (*e.g.*, the Inca Empire, or Egypt of the Old Kingdom period). At least some development of market relations is necessary. There should be not only some craft specialization, but also some regional specialization, that is an integrated economic organism should start its formation within the state.²⁰

e) Many early states existed in the form of barbarian societies, whereas **the developed state can only be based on a civilized society.**

which a new cycle normally began (see, *e.g.*, Turchin 2003; Nefedov 2004; Turchin and Korotayev 2006; Korotayev, Malkov, and Khaltourina 2006a; Grinin 2007j).

¹⁸ Considering the problem of a larger degree of centralization and integration of the developed states in comparison with the early ones it may be useful to take into account the classification of empires developed by Romila Thapar (1981: 411–413) who divides empires into two types depending on the nature of relationship between the metropolitan (centre) and peripheral areas (respectively integrated to a larger or smaller degree among themselves).

¹⁹ However, the transition to the mature statehood (or the transition from a primitive mature state to a typical mature one) was quite frequently connected with profound social upheavals, social and political revolutions, as this was observed in England, France, Germany, Russia and other countries, whereas sometimes such crises resulted in temporary state breakdowns, as this happened, for example, in China in the first half of the 20th century (see about such processes in Egypt in the 16–20th centuries Grinin 2006e, 2007l; Grinin, Korotayev 2009d, 2009e).

²⁰ On the formation of such a market, for example, in Russia, China, Japan, and England see respectively Preobrazhensky 1967: 25–28; Chromov 1988: 148–152; Simonovskaya, Lapina 1987: 119; Galperin 1958: 27; Kuznetsov *et al.* 1988: 115; Vinokurov 1993: 48; Lavrovsky, Barg 1958: 72.

That is why such states only develop in the areas of rather advanced civilizations (and frequently on the basis of leading ethnic groups).

f) **The developed state** conforms significantly better than the early state to the definition of the state as **an organization of coercion functioning in order to keep the lower classes under the domination of the higher classes and to secure the exploitation of the former by the latter**. In the developed state the social role of the state changes. In developed states the coercion serves the interests of upper strata (classes) in a more effective way, which makes it possible for them to exploit the lower strata and to keep them under a tight control,²¹ whereas in many early states exploitation was not very pronounced (see, *e.g.*, Trouwborst 1987: 131; Service 1975). As the state itself takes the function of maintaining social order, it reduces the possibilities of the upper strata to solve themselves the problems of coercive support of their position. This may be realized for example, through the prohibition for them to have their own armed forces to build castles and fortresses, to apply certain coercive measures to those dependant on them. Such prohibitions and regulations increase the importance of law-courts and state administration. This (in addition to other factors) contributes to the more pronounced role of the state coercion with respect to various social groups in the developed state, as compared with the early one.

g) **The presence of a new type of state ideology and/or religion**. Political ideology in the broad sense of this term develops instead of primitive ideas of royal power (based on notions of mythical ancestors, 'the concept of reciprocity and genealogical distance from the sovereign' [Claessen and Skalnik 1978a: 633], royal supernatural abilities and so on). Confucianism in China provides a telling example here (Vasilyev 1983; Lapina 1982). However, such an ideology usually had certain religious forms (*e.g.*, the 16th century Russian treatment of Moscow as 'the Third Rome' see Paips 1993: 306–307). As a result, in many developed states (as was observed in China and other East Asian countries according to Martynov [1982: 6–7]) the state became sacred by itself. In areas with church-type organization of major confessions this demanded

²¹ In fact, Claessen and Skalnik emphasized this point noting that the mature [*i.e.* the developed one in our terms] state becomes an instrument in the hands of the social class of the owners of land and other means of production (Claessen and Skalnik 1978a: 634). However, this emphasis on the private ownership of the means of production underestimates the fact that in most complex agrarian societies the private landownership played a subordinate role and that was not so important in comparison with a person's position within the state hierarchy.

an alliance between the state and the official church (with respect to some European states see, *e.g.*, Le Roy Ladurie 2004: 8).

It is quite natural that different states entered the developed state phase in different ages. Hence, it makes sense to outline a chronology of concrete states entering this phase (a more comprehensive [but less detailed] chronology can be found in Table 5). However, the indicated dates refer to the beginning of the transition to developed statehood, with the main transformations taking place later, sometimes much later.²²

As is known, the first states emerged in the 4th – early 3rd millennia BCE (see, *e.g.*, Vinogradov 2000a: 150–151; Dyakonov 2000: 45–56; Baines and Yoffee 1998: 199; Wright 1977: 386; 1998), though the dates differ depending on various historical and archaeological reconstructions; of course, they also depend on the definition of the state used by different scholars. During the subsequent more than millennium and a half, the main trend in political evolution was the transformation and integration of pre-state formations and polities into early states or early state analogues; some of analogues transformed into early state; small early states and their analogues – into larger ones. In such a complex political landscape rather complex interstate, to be more precise interpolitical connections, were established. Then, in the late 3rd millennium the World System political complexity increased even more. This is connected with the beginning of the transition to large and more organized states, as well as to states of a new evolutionary type.

In the late 3rd millennium BCE, formations close to the developed state first appeared – *i.e.* the analogues of developed states: the Third Dynasty of Ur Sumer and Middle Kingdom Egypt – but turned out to be transient (see below and Table 5). The first developed state (New Kingdom of Egypt) rose in the 16th century BCE.²³

²² In Table 5 for the sake of formalization we had to connect such transformation to certain dates, which, of course, oversimplifies the situation, as it is quite clear that such serious transformation could not take place within a single year (no matter how important it was), but usually occurred within the time span of decades. In addition to this, some of the dates are disputed; yet we did not find it appropriate to discuss various hypotheses on concrete dates within the present context (for more detail see Grinin 2007a).

²³ Egypt possessed a few features that made it possible for the developed state to appear there earlier than in other countries (though partial analogues of the developed state appeared in Mesopotamia already in the late 3rd millennium BCE). Firstly, this is the position of the Egyptian mainland as a narrow strip along one navigable river, the Nile. Secondly, this is a very high level of its ethnic and cultural homogeneity. Thirdly, this is a rather long period of absence of any significant external threat (and in this respect Egypt was very different from Mesopotamia). Fourthly, this is the presence of a strong ideology of royal power. Fifthly, this is the weakness of

In this period we observe major changes in the Egyptian economy as it becomes more intensive and productive, among other things through the use of a new type of plough, hydraulic devices, and the execution of large-scale irrigation projects. There is a considerable progress in crafts, proliferation of bronze tools, development of private property and trade (Vinogradov 2000b: 370–372; Perepyolkin 2001: 259–280). In fact, it was just at this time when the evidence on market transactions and commodity exchange appeared and become numerous, when silver began to supplant grain in the function of money, though incompletely (see, *e.g.*, Monte 1989: 167–168). Considerable changes also took place in socio-political life (Vinogradov 2000b: 370–372; Perepyolkin 2001: 259–280). Centralization increased and the monarch's autonomy decreased radically. A large military empire was created, which was accompanied by the formation of new layers of state administrators (in particular, military and civil administrators of a new type) and a redistribution of material resources in their favor. The working population became freer compared to the 'king's servants' of the Middle Kingdom Age, though many things regarding agrarian relations during this period remain unclear, including information about peasants' rights with respect to the land they tilled and how they were connected to the land itself (Stuchevsky 1966; 1982: 118). Within the New Kingdom we see quite a clear formation of corporate structure and a higher separation (including the hereditary character of the occupations) of various social strata: priests, warriors, craftsmen of different specializations, which became even more pronounced in subsequent epochs. This brought the structure of Egyptian society closer to the structure of estate societies and, as we have mentioned, the presence of large all-state estates is a very important feature of the developed states.

China reached this stage as a result of its first unification in the late 3rd century BCE under Qin Shi Huang.²⁴ Changes that had taken place in the country were enormous, as Qin Shi Huang's reforms had changed the administrative system and territorial division of the country. These reforms unified legislation, the writing system, and the system of meas-

trade and money circulation, which strengthened the redistributive role of the state for a rather long period of time; however, later this point hindered significantly the further development.

²⁴ However, in a few Chinese states of the Zhango period (especially within the Qin state itself [that became the unification core]), as a result of the legist reforms (with respect to Qin these are the Shang Yang reforms of the 350s BCE), we can observe a sort of transition to polities that can be already regarded as developed state analogues (see Table 5).

ures and weights; the money system was reformed, the Great Wall was completed, and so on. These reforms also led to enormous social transformations (Kryukov, Perelomov *et al.* 1983: 17–21; Perelomov 1962).

The Roman state reached this level by the late 1st century BC, with the formation of the emperor's power. However, it is only by the late 3rd century that the Roman Empire distinctively demonstrates all the features of the developed state. In this case those distinctive features are manifested in a 'hierarchical system of estates, hereditary ascription of people to their professions and statuses, a huge elaborated police-bureaucratic apparatus, 'theocratic' power of the Emperor, the state religion that was obligatory for all the subjects and that sanctioned the official ideology' (Shtaerman 1968: 659; see also Petrushevsky 2003).

Byzantium was a developed state from the very beginning, because the Roman tradition was not interrupted there. Thus, it is not strange that in comparison with contemporary Barbarian kingdoms, Byzantium stood apart from the point of view of its regular and unified legislation and legal systems. According to some estimates, by the 6th century the population of the Byzantine Empire reached 50–65 million (Udal'tsova 1988: 15, 34).

As it was said above, sometimes it appears possible to speak about the beginning of the initial phase of the developed state only retrospectively, taking into consideration the further evolution of the respective state. Such changes are described by Lukonin (1987: 141, 137) with respect to Iran in the following way: 'The early Sassanid monarchy in its essence was not very much different from the Parthian one, however, the changing circumstances helped to gradually centralize the state. The *polis* is replaced with the 'royal city', the system of semi-independent kingdoms is substituted with the unified state administrative system, the religious tolerance of the Parthian kings and multiplicity of religions are replaced with the unified state religion – Zoroastrianism... The Sassanid period is characterized by a constantly growing tendency towards centralization'.

However, by the middle of the 3rd century CE, Iran can already be regarded as a developed state with the consolidation of the Sassanid dynasty. Already since the reign of the first Sassanid king, Ardashir I (227–241), major transformations took place in this country (they were caused both by purposeful governmental actions and spontaneous social processes); these transformations included the abolishment of the vassal kings and their replacement with governors, the strengthening of cen-

tralization, adoption of a new religion, formation of new estates, reform of the territorial division, change of ethnic characteristics of the population, linguistic and cultural consolidation of the country (Lukonin 1987; Novoseltsev 1995: 24, 31; see also Fry 1972; Kolesnikov 1987). Note for example, that the Shahinshah appointed the heads of the four estates, which comprised the nation, at the level of the whole state (Kolesnikov 1987: 185).

It may be suggested that Japan entered the developed state phase by the early 15th century, when *Shōguns* of the Ashikaga dynasty managed to strengthen their control over centralized power and, as a result, they came close to being in the position of absolute rulers of the country, though the period of their real power was not long (Tolstoguzov 1995: 561; Kuznetsov *et al.* 1988: 89).²⁵ Centralization attempts were undertaken in Japan already since the 12th century, which among other things manifested themselves in the formation of the very institution of shogunate (1192 CE). However, it was only in the 15th century when one could detect contours of the socio-political system that reached its maturity two centuries later, during the Tokugawa shogunate: a deified Emperor who did not actually rule; concentration of real power by the *Shōgun*; his reliance on the military servant estate of the *samurai*; concentration of regional power by the local rulers (*daimyō*) who, however, were controlled by the *Shōgun* in a variety of ways. Naturally, the overall system was based on resources extracted from the tax-paying estates of peasants, craftsmen, and merchants. The *samurai* estate had already been formed to a sufficient degree by the 14th century when it was finally separated from the peasantry, whereas the *daimyō* estate began its formation just in the 15th century (Kuznetsov *et al.* 1988: 73, 89; Spevakovsky 1981: 12–17).

France entered this phase in the late 13th century during the reign of Philip IV the Fair (1285–1314).²⁶ By this time in France, due to the activities of his predecessors and favorable economic development, we observe the formation of a sufficiently developed administrative apparatus, a taxation system, court system, and the general strengthening of the state. The royal domain had significantly grown, though the level of political

²⁵ As this happened frequently at the first phase of the developed statehood, the political centralization declined some time later, and the internal warfare started. The second phase of centralization was over by the late 16th century.

²⁶ He became famous for his confiscation of the huge assets of the Knights Templar, and the movement of the official seat of papacy to Avignon.

centralization was still rather low. We can also observe the formation of estates and their political representation (*les états généraux*) (Lyublinskaya 1972: 94–109; Tsaturova 2002: 12–13; Hay 1975: 138). However, the Hundred Years' War retarded the process of the French statehood development. Afterwards, since the first half of the 15th century, they had to restart the political centralization process from an extremely low benchmark, when the main issue was the very survival of France and her French king (Hay 1975: 153–160).

Spain entered this phase in the late 15th century (as a result of the union of Castile and Aragon). The joint reign of Ferdinand and Isabella (1479–1504) was a turning point in Spanish history. They managed to unite the country, to strengthen the order within it, to undertake important reforms, to establish an effective control over nobility, though its strength had not been eliminated till the end (Johnson 1955: 105–106). The discovery and colonization of the New World accelerated the development of Spain.

England entered this phase in the late 15th century and the early 16th century (after the end of the War of the Roses and the Tudor dynasty coming to power). It was already Henry VII (1485–1509) who achieved much with respect to the political centralization of the country; in general, as a result of the Tudor dynasty reign that lasted more than a century, a new political system (absolute monarchy) formed and flourished in England (see Dmitrieva 1993: 163), though English absolutism was significantly different from its French (let alone Russian) counterpart (see Saprykin 1991: 207–208; Karev 1993: 160–161).

For many European countries the 16th century was a 'period of state construction' (Elliott 1974: 80). But this century also served as a turning point for the political evolution of such countries as Russia, India and Iran. In Russia the developed state formed in the second half of the 16th century during the reign of Ivan the Terrible (1547–1584). Changes in Russia's political and social life that took place in this period are well known. Ivan revised the law code (known as *Sudebnik*), created a standing army with guns (the *streltsy*) and improved artillery. He reformed the central and regional administration by establishing the *Zemsky Sobor* (a legislative body of a parliamentary type), the council of the nobles (known as the Chosen Council), the local self-government in rural regions. Then he annexed the Kazan and Astrakhan Khanates (see, e.g., Shmidt 1999).

In India the developed state formed some time after the creation of the Mughal Empire, in the second half of the 16th century, during Akbar's reign. In contrast to its predecessor, the Delhi Sultanate (the 13th and 14th centuries) a number of whose achievements were applied within the Mughal state, the latter was a much stronger and more centralized empire.²⁷ Akbar who ruled for half a century (1556–1605), united under his rule the main part of the Indian territory and conducted important reforms of state administration that in many respects continued the line of Akbar's grandfather, Babur (Azimdzhanova 1977: 152). However, the further development of Indian statehood met with considerable impediments, though in some respects (in particular with respect to the elaboration of the administrative system) it reached a considerable degree of maturity (see, *e.g.*, Ashrafyan 1987: 230). India remained at the level of a primitive developed state, and, as a result of the long and cruel reign of Akbar's grandson, Aurangzeb, (1658–1707), the Mughal Empire began to decline and virtually self-destructed (Antonova 1979: 213–225, 233–241).

The inability for further development also manifested itself in Iran. After centuries of foreign rule, crises and stagnation, in the late 16th century and the early 17th century, during the reign of Abbas I (1587–1629) and his successors Iran became again a large and powerful state. Important reforms were conducted. At this time we can say that Iran entered again the developed state phase. However, subsequent rulers turned out to be rather incapable, and in the late 17th century and the early 18th century, economic situation in the country became critical, trade (including the foreign trade) declined, the tax burden increased, social relations between the populace and state became aggravated, and rebellions began. A political and economic crisis developed, which was aggravated by Turkish and Afghan invasions, as well as interference by foreign powers; these resulted in the extreme devastation of the country and economic stagnation. Even a temporary strengthening of Iran during the reign of Nadir-Shah who became famous due to his successful wars,

²⁷ The Delhi Sultanate achieved the peak of its might during the reign of Alauddin Khilji (1296–1316). However, his huge empire was an unstable military-administrative formation, from which a considerable number of principalities split by the end of Alauddin's rule (Ashrafyan 1960: 228). Nevertheless, Delhi Sultanate can be regarded as the developed state analogue (see Table 5). The Mughal Dynasty was founded by the famous Central Asian warrior and poet Babur (from Timur's lineage) who started his conquest campaigns in India in 1519. He conducted a number of important reforms (especially, with respect to taxation) in the conquered part of India (see Azimdzhanova 1977).

including the capture of Delhi in 1739, did not change the situation for long. At the end of his life Nadir-Shah himself conducted such an irrational internal policy that after his death the country experienced political disintegration, internal wars, power struggle between various cliques. Iran virtually disintegrated again (Petrushevsky 1977; Kuznetsova 1986: 229). And as in the 18th and 19th centuries the country was under the strong influence of Russia and the European powers, its further independent development was greatly hindered.

The entrance of the Ottoman Empire into the developed state phase can also be dated to the 16th century. It appears that this transition took place during the reign of Suleiman I Kanuni (the Lawgiver) who was called the Magnificent by the Europeans (1520–1566).²⁸ By this time we can observe the formation of a sufficiently effective military fief system that provided the Empire with a rather battle-worthy and large army. The Ottomans developed a system of registration of fief-holders (the *sipahis*). Suleiman elaborated it by forbidding the governors to distribute the fiefs and to confirm the rights of the fief heirs. He also conducted a number of important reforms with respect to administrative division, taxation ordering, relations between landlords and tenants. Numerous laws on the administration of various provinces (that regulated administrative organization, taxation, property relations and so on) were worked out. The level of administrative organization also was rather high by the contemporary standards (see, *e.g.*, Findley 1989).

During this time Turkey can be considered to be a sufficiently centralized empire, whose backbone was represented by the military fief (*timar*) system (see, *e.g.*, Oreshkova 1986), whereas its center was one of the largest world cities of the century, Istanbul, whose population in 1550 is estimated to have been between 400 and 500 thousand (Petrosyan 1990: 72–73, 103; see also Chase-Dunn and Manning 2002: 387).²⁹

²⁸ However, it cannot be excluded that the formation of the developed state may be dated to the end of the reign of Bayezid II (1481–1512), or the beginning of the reign of Selim I (1512–1520). Already during the reign of Bayezid II the Ottoman socio-political and economic institutions were put in order, a rather clear religious-legal was developed for them, which was connected with activities of a large group of the Ottoman *'ulamā'*. In general, during the reigns of Selim I and Suleiman I Ottoman state institutions acquired that developed form, which afterwards was considered as a classical standard (Ivanov, Oreshkova 2000: 76).

²⁹ Note that if the tradition maintaining that Selim I took the Caliphal title from the last Egyptian Abbasid Caliph after the Ottoman conquest of Egypt still had some substance (though it is generally regarded now as the late 18th century fabrication [see, *e.g.*, Sourdel *et al.* 1990]), this

Turkey was the only Eastern empire that managed for a rather long time (and not always without success) to compete militarily with some European powers and even their alliances. For more detail about the chronology of developed states' existence and their number see Table 5 and Diagram 7.

8. ANALOGUES OF DEVELOPED STATES AND SOME NOTES ON THE WORLD SYSTEM POLITICAL EVOLUTION

Within our systems of definitions, the first developed state (New Kingdom Egypt) appeared in the 16th century BCE. However, its formation was preceded by the formation of the developed state analogues a few centuries before (see Table 5 below). The point is that with time some early states achieved such a high level of administrative development that, to a certain degree, they could be considered analogues (though incomplete) of the developed states. We mean such polities as the Third Dynasty of Ur state and the kingdom of Hammurabi in Mesopotamia. In addition to them the first complete analogues developed (*e.g.*, Middle Kingdom Egypt). Thus the first rise of the developed state and their analogues took place around the late 3rd millennium and the first half of the 2nd millennium BCE, which can be seen in Diagram 7 below.

Table 5. Chronological table of the formation of the developed states

	<i>State</i>	<i>Note</i>	<i>Approximate date of the phase beginning</i>	<i>Marking event</i>	<i>Approximate date of the phase end</i>	<i>Marking event</i>
1.	The Third Dynasty of Ur Sumer	Incomplete analogue	-2111	Beginning of Ur-Nammu's Reign	-2003	The fall of the Third Dynasty of Ur
2.	Middle Kingdom Egypt	Analogue	-2000	Beginning of the 12 th Dynasty	-1700	Beginning of the Second Intermediate Period

could be regarded as a rather logical measure, as it would have strengthened the power of the Ottoman sultans providing additional legitimization for their power over their subjects most of whom were Muslims (Petrosyan 1990: 58–69, 72).

	<i>State</i>	<i>Note</i>	<i>Approximate date of the phase beginning</i>	<i>Marking event</i>	<i>Approximate date of the phase end</i>	<i>Marking event</i>
3.	The Old Babylonian Kingdom	Incomplete analogue	-1792	Beginning of Hammurabi's Reign	-1595	The Kassite conquest of Babylonia
4.	New Kingdom and Late Pharaonic Egypt		-1580	Beginning of the 18 th Dynasty	-525	Persian conquest of Egypt
5.	The New Babylonian Kingdom	Analogue	-605	Beginning of Nebuchadnezzar the Great's Reign	-539	Persian conquest of Babylonia
6.	The Achaemenid Empire	Analogue	-518	Beginning of Darius' reforms	-330	Alexander's conquest
7.	The Qin state in China	Analogue	-350s	Beginning of Shang Yang's reforms	-221	Formation of Qin Shi Huang's empire
8.	Ptolemaic Egypt		-305	Ptolemy I Soter is proclaimed the king of Egypt	-30	Roman conquest of Egypt
9.	The Seleucid State	Analogue	-305	Seleucus I Nicator assumes royal power	-64	Roman conquest of the remaining part of the Seleucid state
10.	China		-221	Formation of the Qin Empire	the late 17 th cent. – 1722	Transformation of China into a mature state analogue in the final period of Kangxi's reign
11.	Roman Empire		-30	Beginning of Octavianus Augustus' reign	476	Fall of the Western Roman Empire
12.	Sassanid Iran		227–241	Reign of the first Sassanid king, Ardashir I	633–651	Arab conquest of Iran
13.	Byzantium		395	Division of the Roman Empire into the Western and Eastern ones	1453	Turk conquest of Constantinople
14.	The Abbasid Khalifate	Analogue	750	The Abbasid dynasty coming to power	945	The final lost of the real political power by the Abbasids

	<i>State</i>	<i>Note</i>	<i>Approximate date of the phase beginning</i>	<i>Marking event</i>	<i>Approximate date of the phase end</i>	<i>Marking event</i>
15.	The Umayyad Khalifate in Spain	Analogue	912	Beginning of `Abd al-Rahman III reign	1031	The final disintegration of the Khalifate, beginning of the epoch of leaders of small polities (<i>muluk al-tawa'if</i>)
16.	Arab Egypt	A part of the Ottoman Empire since 1525	969	The Fatimid conquest of Egypt and the transfer of the capital to Cairo	1922	Formal proclamation of the independence of Egypt
17.	Cambodia (Angkor)	Analogue	The early 11 th century	Unification of the country by Suryavarman I	The late 13 th century	The disintegration of the Khmer Empire
18.	France		1285	Beginning of the reign of Philippe IV the Fair	1665–1683	Colbert's reforms. Beginning of France's transformation into a mature state during the reign of Louis XIV
19.	The Delhi Sultanate	Analogue	1290	Beginning of the Khilji Dynasty	1398	Delhi sacked by Timur
20.	Portugal		1385–1433	Reign of Juan I	1850s	Saldanha's liberal reform
21.	Japan		1392	Unification of dynasty, return of the capital to Kyoto	1868	Beginning of transformation of Japan into a mature state as a result of the 'Meiji Restoration'
22.	Korea		1392	Beginning of the Li Dynasty	1945	Liberation of Korea from the Japanese rule. Mature state formation in both Koreas
23.	Vietnam		1428	Beginning of the Younger Le Dynasty	1883–1884	Final French conquest of Vietnam

	<i>State</i>	<i>Note</i>	<i>Approximate date of the phase beginning</i>	<i>Marking event</i>	<i>Approximate date of the phase end</i>	<i>Marking event</i>
24.	Spain		1479	Unification of Castile and Aragon	1834–1843	The third revolution, formation of the constitutional monarchy regime. Beginning of Spain's transformation into a mature state
25.	England		1485	Beginning of the Tudors' dynasty	1688	Glorious Revolution. Beginning of England's transformation into a mature state
26.	Austria		1493–1519	Reign and reforms of Maximilian I	1780–1790	'Enlightened Absolutism' of Joseph II. Beginning of Austria's transformation into a mature state
27.	The Ottoman Empire		1520	Beginning of the reign of Suleiman I the Magnificent	1908	Revolution. Beginning of Turkey's transformation into a mature state
28.	Sweden		1523–1560	Reign of Gustav I Vasa	1771–1792	Reign and reforms of Gustav III. Beginning of Sweden's transformation into a mature state
29.	Denmark		1536	Royal reform in Denmark	1849	July 1849 Constitution. Denmark's transformation into a mature state
30.	Russia		1547	Coronation of Ivan IV ('the Terrible')	1801	Beginning of the reign of Alexander I. Beginning of Russia's transformation into a mature state
31.	The Mughal State in India		1556	Beginning of Akbar's reign	1707	Aurangzeb's death. Beginning of the Mughal Empire's disintegration

	<i>State</i>	<i>Note</i>	<i>Approximate date of the phase beginning</i>	<i>Marking event</i>	<i>Approximate date of the phase end</i>	<i>Marking event</i>
32.	The Netherlands		1579	The Utrecht Unity of the northern provinces of the Netherlands	1815–1839	Final delimitation of the Netherlands' borders; transformation into a mature state
33.	Iran		1587	Beginning of the reign of Abbas I	1925	Reza Shah being proclaimed the Shah of Iran. Beginning of Iran's transformation into a mature state
34.	Poland		Late 15 th – early 16 th cent.	Formation of the <i>szlachta</i> 'constitution' (the 'Nobles' Commonwealth')	1795	The third division of Poland
35.	Prussia		First half of the 17 th cent.	Formation of the Brandenburg Prussian state	Late 18 th cent.	Beginning of Prussia's transformation into a mature state
36.	USA		1776	Beginning of the Independence War	1829–1837	President Jackson's reforms. USA's transformation into a mature state
37.	Brazil		1822	Declaration of independence of the Brazilian Empire	1889	Declaration of the Brazilian Federative Republic; beginning of transformation into a mature state
38.	Argentine		1826	Declaration of the Federal Republic of Argentine	1853	Adoption of the constitution of the Argentinean Confederation; beginning of transformation into a mature state

However, for more than a millennium the early states remained absolutely dominant, whereas the forming developed state analogues turned out to be rather unstable. A new and much more sustained rise of the developed states was observed in the middle and second half of the 1st millennium BCE. Furthermore, by the early 1st millennium CE developed states and their analogues controlled a substantial proportion of the World System territory (and also the majority of the World System population lived just within this territory), as the developed states and their analogues included the largest polities of this period (the Achaemenid Empire, the Ptolemaic and Seleucid states, the Qin and Han empires in China, the Roman, and later Byzantine, Empire, as well as the Sassanid Empire in Iran [for more detail see Grinin, Korotayev 2006]).³⁰


During the whole 1st millennium CE the number of developed states and their analogues fluctuated significantly in connection with the rather well known complex and dramatic events of world history (the fall of the West Roman Empire, the Great Migration, Arab conquests *etc.*). However, in general their number remained rather small, whereas the territory under their control sometimes decreased significantly. The same can be observed with respect to the world urban popu-

³⁰ It appears necessary to stress that some states of the period in question that we classify as 'early states' were actually at a rather high level of development and could be compared in some respects with the developed state analogues, or primitive developed states. This is accounted for by the fact that such early states were in the highest phase of this stage, that is, in the transitional early state phase when some elements of the developed state appeared (albeit in a fragmentary form). The fact that only a few early states managed to get transformed into developed ones was noticed long ago. We believe that for early states the inability to get transformed into developed states was normal, whereas the ability to do so should be rather regarded as a positive exception. Within such circumstances, on the one hand, the development could continue; however, due to the enormous difficulty of the respective evolutionary breakthrough, such a development could acquire special forms, as a result of which such political systems could reach rather high levels of sociocultural complexity without being transformed into developed states. One of the most salient examples of political systems that overgrew significantly the level of a typical early state without being transformed into a developed state is represented by the Indian Maurya Empire that demonstrated a rather high level of administrative elaboration. This could be judged, for example, on the basis of data supplied by famous *Arthaśāstra* whose authorship is ascribed to Kautilya (traditionally identified with Chandragupta's [c.320–293 BCE] minister Chanakya). Though most indologists treat *Arthaśāstra's* description of the Mauryan political system in a rather skeptical way (see, *e.g.*, Lelioukhine 2000), the question that we inevitably confront is how its author could give such a convincing description of such complex (and so adapted to the Indian conditions) state organization if he had seen nothing comparable in reality. Other examples of such 'overgrown' early states that did not manage to get transformed into the developed states are represented by a number of medieval polities of the early 2nd millennium CE, *e.g.*, the Khwarezmshahian Empire.

lation and urbanization rates (see Korotayev, Grinin 2006). All this is rather congruent with those theories that maintain that the 1st millennium CE was a period of deep qualitative transformation of the World System and the whole historical process; the first millennium CE was the period of preparation for a new qualitative (and quantitative) breakthrough in the field of technologies and production as a whole (for more detail see: Chapter 1, see also Grinin 2006e, 2006f, 2006g, 2007f, 2007k).³¹ A new technology qualitative breakthrough (or what one may refer to as ‘the transition to a new production principle’) can be dated to the mid-15th century, though some of its signs can be discerned in the 13th and 14th centuries (see: Chapter 1, see also Grinin 2006e, 2006f, 2006g, 2007f, 2007k for more detail). The same dynamics can be traced with respect to the number of developed states and the territory controlled by them.

The subsequent growth in urbanization (caused by the transition to industrial production) led not only to the ‘victory’ of the developed states over the early ones (see Diagram 7), but also to the formation of a new evolutionary type of state: the mature state, which was tightly connected with industrialization and the industrial economy.

Diagram 7. Growth of the number of developed states



³¹ We mean the so-called early industrial revolutions of the first half of the 2nd millennium CE; see, e.g., Bernal 1965; Braudel 1973, 1982, 1985; Hill 1947; Johnson 1955.

9. MATURE STATE

The first initial (primitive) mature state (France in the reign of Louis XIV) appeared in the late 17th century. Yet, only in the 19th century they became dominant in Europe and the New World (see Table 6 and Diagram 8). Finally, by the end of the 20th century this type of state was prevalent everywhere, except possibly certain parts of Tropical Africa and Oceania.

So in general, the mature state is a result of the development of capitalism and the Industrial Revolution; thus, it has a radically different production basis than previous state types. In addition to this, the transition to the mature statehood (or its analogue) is connected with the demographic revolution. Almost in every industrialized country a very rapid, explosive population growth was observed (see, *e.g.*, Armengaud 1976; Korotayev, Malkov, Khaltourina 2006a; Grinin 2007a, 2010a).

The mature state significantly surpasses the developed state with respect to the complexity and efficiency of its political organization and legal system; it necessarily has a professional bureaucracy with its definite characteristics (see *e.g.*, Weber 1947: 333–334), distinct mechanisms and elaborated procedures of the legitimate transition of power.

The mature state *can be defined as a category that denotes an organic form of political organization of an economically and culturally developed society, a system of bureaucratic and other specialized political institutions, organs and laws supporting the internal and external political life; it is an organization of power, administration, and order maintenance that is separated from the population and that possesses: a) sovereignty; b) supremacy, legitimacy and the reality of power within a certain territory and a certain circle of people; c) a developed apparatus of coercion and control; and d) the ability to change social relations and norms in a systematic way.*

It makes sense to pay attention to the point that the developed state is defined as a *natural* form of the political organization of society (that is, though the developed state is necessary to sustain social order in a supercomplex agrarian society, in principle, its main agricultural population could do without state, let alone a large state if there were no threat of external invasions). In contrast, the mature state is defined as an *or-*

ganic form of the political organization of a society, that is, such a form without which a respective type of society (and its population) could not reproduce itself in principle.

In the meantime, statehood itself becomes virtually separated from concrete persons. In the monarchies of the initial period of the mature states a monarch (like Louis XIV) could still claim: '*L'État, c'est moi!*',³² whereas in the constitutional regimes this became just impossible. We can also observe the development of certain autonomy of the bureaucratic apparatus and army that more and more act as an abstract mechanism of civil service.³³ All these serve as a basis for the formation of civil society.³⁴

So France can be regarded as a mature state since the late 17th century. Let us mention just one telling example: by the early 16th century there were 8 thousand officials in France, whereas by the mid-17th century their number grew to 46 thousand (Koposov 1993: 180).

In England the mature statehood formed in the first decades of the 18th century, that is, some time after the Glorious Revolution of 1688, the overthrow of James II, and the enthronement of William III of Orange, when a new system of state control began to form: constitutional monarchy, the two-party system, and a single-party government.

In Prussia the mature statehood had existed since the late 18th century. By the early 19th century 'within military, as well as civil, administration it established standards for whole Europe' (Parsons 1997: 100). In Russia it has existed since the early 19th century – since the reforms of Alexander I and Mikhail Speransky. In Japan it appeared in the last third of the 19th century (after the 'Restoration of Meidji'). The USA became a mature state after the period that is denoted as 'Jackson's Democracy' named after the President Andrew Jackson (1829–1837) when

³² But even Louis XIV admitted at least openly that the state's welfare is the first duty of the king who has some obligations to the subjects (Lysyakov 2002: 199).

³³ Even in totalitarian countries their rigid ideologies, 'popular' ruling parties, and other institutions existed formally 'for the well-being of the people and society', which restricted significantly the opportunities of the officials' personal self-enrichment.

³⁴ Naturally, in the *initial (primitive)* phase of the mature statehood we find some archaic features that are inherited from the earlier epochs, a certain weakness of the state. For example, in France in the 18th century the sale of governmental posts continued, the internal customs remained, whereas in Russia the serfdom survived until 1861. Later such archaisms disappear as a result of evolutionary and revolutionary transformations.

we observe the formation of a two-party system and the abolition of the electoral qualification system.

China can be regarded as a mature state *analogue* since the late 17th century or the early 18th century (the final period of Kangxi's [1661–1722] reign). This state managed to organize politically an enormous (even from the present-day point of view) population against the background of its very fast (for the 18th century) demographic growth (McNeill 1993: 240–244). During the 18th century the Chinese population grew from 100–150 to over 300 million (Kryukov *et al.* 1987: 61–63; Korotayev, Malkov, and Khaltourina 2006b: 47–88; McNeill 1993: 240). In Qing China we can also observe a rather high level of administrative technologies, a number of social innovations atypical for developed (but not mature) states (for more detail see Grinin 2006d, 2006g, 2007a, 2007b, 2007i, 2010a).

The main characteristics of the mature state:

a) it is already an industrial or industrialized state where a unified economic organism integrated by effective communications is formed. The ensuring of its normal functioning becomes a more and more important task of the state. An important role is also played here by military needs;

b) it has a sufficiently high level of administrative organization, a developed system of laws, or state regulations (as was found in the states of the ‘Communist Block’).

In the mature state, administration institutions, as well as the apparatus of coercion and control, are both more elaborated and more specialized than in the developed state; while in the latter those organs and institutions far from always had clearly demarcated functions. In the developed state both supreme and local administrative organs were often multifunctional and unclear with respect to their tasks.³⁵ Real bu-

³⁵ For example, in the 16th century in France (as well as in Russia and other countries) we find the ‘narrow’ council of the king whose composition was indefinite and whose functions were rather vague. The same can be said about the representatives of the contemporary administration – *bailliages, sénéchaussées, prévôts, gouverneurs* with ‘their extremely indefinite administrative-judicial and military-administrative jurisdiction’ (Skazkin 1972: 170, 171). ‘Outside the court and government the classical monarchy is characterized by a partial, and sometimes weakly centralized system of administration’. The situation only began to change in the 17th century, especially under Richelieu (Le Roy Ladurie 2004: 15).

reaucracy was only concentrated primarily within certain spheres that were different in different countries (*e.g.*, in taxation, or courts of law), whereas it could be absent in the other spheres of life, especially at the level of local government.³⁶ And such a situation did not always change immediately at the level of the primitive mature state (*cf.*, for example, the situation in France in the 18th century [Malov 1994: 140]), whereas it is changed in really systematic way only at the level of the typical mature state (for more detail see Grinin 2007a, 2010a);

c) a new political regime is established: the representative democracy or one-party state. There are usually present the worked out forms of constitutions and the division of powers, and the role of law (especially civil law) significantly increases. In general, in mature states the systems of law and court procedures reach a level of development and elaboration that it appears difficult to compare them with the ones of earlier epoch (in totalitarian and authoritarian states instead legal branch we observe very complex political-administrative system);

d) one of the most important functions of the mature state is to secure not only the social order, but also the legal order, which was often paid little attention by the developed states;

e) mature states politically organize societies, where estates have disappeared, the industrial classes have formed.

In connection with the growth of the role of property relations, the establishment of legal equality of the citizens, the abolishment of the privileges of the estates, the mature state is gradually transformed from the estate-class state to the purely class-corporate state. Thus, here the role of new industrial classes (bourgeois and employees or the analogous groups of the socialist *nomenklatura* and employees), dramatically increases within the state system. As the class division is mostly economic (see, *e.g.*, Weber 1971, 2003), and not juridical, it becomes necessary to have organizations and corporations that express the interests of certain parts and groups of certain classes (and sometimes interests of a certain class as a whole). These are various organizations and political parties

³⁶ Even in pre-Modern China the bureaucratic apparatus did not penetrate the local level where the administrative functions were performed by the 'literati' (see, *e.g.*, Nikiforov 1977: 211–213).

of both workers and bourgeoisie (see, *e.g.*, Bergier 1976; for more detail see Grinin 2010a), as well as other social strata.³⁷

f) it is based on the modern type of nation (or a set of nations), nation-state formed, that is why it can only exist within a society with a unified national (or supranational) culture (about the tight relations between the nation and the state see *e.g.*, Armstrong 1982; Gellner 1983; Freidzon 1999: 10–12; Grinin 1997c; 2006e: 201–203, 222–235; 2009d).

In the developed states mass literacy was almost never observed, written information sources were controlled by the elites, whereas the mass literacy is normal for mature states where written information sources became available to the general population already in the 18th and 19th centuries and where the importance of mass media grew enormously. This stimulated radical changes in the forms, styles and directions of administration and contacts between the government and the people.

That is why such a state is concerned with its influence on culture, including control over language, religion, education and so on. Hence, the ideology of the mature state always includes some nationalism (or some other ideas about the superiority of the given state's population; for example, its special progressiveness, revolutionary spirit, love for democracy/freedom, certain historical deeds, *etc.*);

With respect to the relations between the state and society – that is, the state and the person – we find it necessary to speak about the formation of a new type of ideology that can be denoted as **civil** ideology, because it explained the relations between the person and the state from the point of view of the person-citizen who had equal legal rights and duties and lived in a nation-state. As a result of revolutions, reforms and proliferation of education this civil ideology gradually replaced the sacred traditional ideology of the developed state that implied the sanctity of the monarch's power and the inviolability of the estate social order.

³⁷ For example, in Britain the first national federation of the entrepreneurs' unions appeared in 1873; in Germany 77 various entrepreneurs' organizations were created in the 1870s, whereas in the 1890s 325 new organizations of this type appeared (Grigorieva 2001: 25) It is necessary to take into account the fact that within the context of a developed class stratification even purely economic corporations cannot remain politically neutral. In particular, the trade union movement with its growth and reinforcement 'inevitably tries to influence the state and its economic and social policies' (Shlepner 1959: 386).

Nationalism can be considered as the most universal type of civil ideology. Liberalism, democratism, revolutionism, and reformism can be regarded as other influential ideologies of the age of classical capitalism. The later period observed the formation of imperialism (as an ideology), communism, fascism, and anticommunism. As a result, the very criteria of the state's dignity changed. The splendor of the Court was replaced with the economic power of the nation, a more just social order, and, subsequently, the quality of the population's life as the criteria for judging the level of state development.

Thus, the mature state bases itself on new types of infrasocietal links:

- material links – unified economic organization and unified market;
- cultural links – unified culture-information organizations;
- national links – consciousness of national unity and development of new symbols of this unity: nation, national interests, supreme interests;
- consolidation on the basis of ideology: cult of law and constitution, cult of nation;
- consolidation on the basis of participation in pan-national organizations and corporations (trade unions, parties, movements) and participation in pan-national elections.

Table 6. Chronological table of the mature states' formation

<i>Year</i>	<i>Mature states and their analogues</i>	<i>States in the phase of transition to the mature statehood</i>
1500	0	0
1600	0	0
1650	0	3 (France, Britain, China)
1700	3 (France, Britain, China ³⁸)	0
1750	3 (France, Britain, China)	4 (Austria, Prussia, Russia, Sweden)
1800	7 (France, Britain, Austria, China, Russia, Prussia, Sweden)	6 (Denmark, Italy, ³⁹ Spain, Portugal, the USA, the Netherlands)


³⁸ China before 1900 is regarded as a mature state analogue.

³⁹ It may be maintained that with the Napoleonic conquests in Italy and the formation of a united Italian state (first a republic, and then a kingdom – under the French protectorate) Italy began to move rather fast towards mature statehood. We believe that the transition of a number of Italian states (Venice, Florence, Genoa) to developed statehood took place already in the 15th century, but because of constant wars, invasions, internal influences, instability of interstate borders and states themselves the political development of Italy slowed down in the subsequent centuries.

Year	Mature states and their analogues	States in the phase of transition to the mature statehood
1850	14 (France, Britain, Austria, China, Russia, Prussia, Sweden, Belgium, Denmark, Spain, the USA, Piedmont [Italy], Switzerland, the Netherlands)	6 (Argentine, Brazil, Mexico, Portugal, Chile, Japan)
1900	25 (Argentine, Austria-Hungary, Belgium, Brazil, Britain, Bulgaria, Chile, China, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Japan, Italy, Luxemburg, Mexico, the Netherlands, Portugal, Rumania, Russia, Serbia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the USA)	19 (Australia, Canada, Cuba, Egypt, Finland, Iceland, India, Iran, Ireland, Korea, New Zealand, Norway, Pakistan, ⁴⁰ Philippines, Poland, the South African Union, Turkey, Uruguay, Vietnam)

The overall dynamics of the number of mature states is presented in Diagram 8.

Diagram 8. Dynamics of the mature states' number (1500–1900 CE)



10. ADDITIONAL COMPARISON BETWEEN EVOLUTIONARY TYPES OF STATE

The above mentioned evolutionary types of states differ among themselves also by a number of other characteristics. In particular, it appears

⁴⁰ The prospective Pakistan state as known, was the part of British Empire populated mainly by the Muslims.

necessary to pay attention to these differences with respect to the interaction between *centralized power, the elite, and the commoners* ('*population*'). In the present chapter, the model of interaction for the triangle CENTER – ELITE – COMMONERS (POPULACE, PEOPLE) within each evolutionary type of state can be only presented as short descriptions of one of the most typical situations (see Grinin 2007a, 2007b, 2007i for more detail). These schemes, which are presented only as one of possible models of such interaction, look as follows.

In the early state we frequently observe a situation where the elites, basing themselves on their resources (lands, clients, military force) or their special position (as recognized representatives of certain lineages or dynasties, heads of tribal formations and so on), control, in some way or another, a very large part of the territory of a respective country, or even most of it. The commoners find themselves under the jurisdiction and effective control of the elites and they are required to perform state duties. A considerable part of the commoner population (especially serfs, slaves and so on) find themselves altogether out of the state's jurisdiction. Within such situations the center turns out to be actually an aggregate of the elites' forces (both regional elites and the ones represented in the capital). Frequently the center cannot organize the main functions of the state without elites, because the state does not possess yet the necessary apparatus, or this apparatus is rather weak. Thus, the interrelations between the commoner population and the center are mediated by the elites to a very considerable degree. As a result, the elites take control of the territorial-functional institutions, in particular the fixation of duties, tax collection, judiciary, organization of military forces and defense, land distribution (this is frequently combined with the elites' immunity and autonomy as a sort of payment for the performance of such functions). We can mention as examples of such early states the medieval states of Europe, such as the Frankish state in the 8th – 10th centuries, England (both before the Norman conquest and some time after it), German states in the 10th – 15th centuries, Kievan Rus and Muscovy up to the age of Ivan III. This is typical for many ancient and medieval states outside Europe (*e.g.*, for Mesopotamia after Hammurabi, for the Hittite Kingdom, for Chou China, considerable parts of the Japanese history, and so on).

In the developed state the elites are significantly more integrated in the state system, thus they are much more connected to the center.

In comparison with the early state, the developed state possesses a considerably larger and much more sophisticated administration apparatus. However, it is only represented systematically in the center, whereas at the periphery it is rather fragmentary. That is why here the elites still act as a component of the regional state apparatus, especially with respect to the military functions, but also frequently with regards to general administration, taxation, judiciary, religious subsystem and so on. In particular, large landowners frequently performed taxation, judiciary and administrative functions; the taxes were collected by tax-farmers and the police functions would be performed by representatives of special social groups (*e.g.*, in the Ottoman provinces they were performed by the Janissaries [see, *e.g.*, Kimche 1968: 455]).

This point does not contradict the idea that the developed state is more organically connected with the society than the early one does. Within the developed state the relations between the center and the commoners are both direct and indirect, that is, they are partly mediated by the elites, but partly these relations are conducted directly through the formal and official local state apparatus. In the meantime the commoners rely more and more on the center as a possible protector against the arbitrariness of the local elites, which is much less typical for the early state.

In the mature state its administrative-bureaucratic apparatus becomes quite systemic and complete, which makes it possible for the center to conduct its interaction with the commoner population directly. In the mature state it appears more accurate to speak about the interrelations between the elites, the populace, and the *state* (rather than the *center*). We observe the relationships between the state and the elite becoming civil. This means that the elites (that is, large-scale landowners, businessmen, financiers, as well as the intellectuals' elite) stop performing the direct functions of the state structures, these functions are now performed almost entirely by the formal, official state organs; that is, the elites can be regarded as a part of the civil society, no longer as a part of the state. However, the elites' privileges and status are still protected by the state. All these contribute to the formation of civil society. The relations between the state and the population are direct and immediate both through the state apparatus (*e.g.*, through taxation or judicial organs), and through the participation of the populace in elections.

Summing up one may say that in the early state the center only unites (quite weakly) the territories and population through the mediation of the elites that provide most of the direct interaction with the populace; in the developed state the center directly or indirectly integrates the elites into the state apparatus, limits the elites' influence on the populace, establishes some direct relations with the populace; the mature state (with the help of a rather sophisticated administrative apparatus and elaborated legal system that it possesses) eliminates the administrative-territorial control of the elites over the population, transforms the elites into a part of the civil society, and establishes systematic direct links between the state and the populace.

11. MATURE STATE TRANSFORMATION IN THE 20th CENTURY

The mature state developed due to the formation of the classes of entrepreneurs and employees and the emergence of the class-corporate state. For the mature states of Europe, this process was completed by the end of the 19th century. Gradually, however, the social classes began to 'diffuse' and turn into fragmented and less consolidated groups, such as strata, layers, and so on. This transformation is determined by very rapid changes in production, demography, and education.⁴¹ This occurred in Europe in the first half of the 20th century. Such a transformation of the mature state is connected with very fast changes in production and related spheres, including acceleration of migration processes, creation of conveyor production, explosive growth of the education subsystem, the service spheres, women's employment, and so on (on some of these processes see, *e.g.*, Marshall 2005 [1959]: 23). Suffice to mention that the world industrial production grew between 1890 and 1913 four times (Solovyov, Yevzerov 2001: 280).

The most important features of the new social structure are the following:

- the formation and development of the middle class that gradually became numerically dominant (Fisher 1999: 89);
- growth of the importance of such factors of social stratification signs, such as education and social mobility (Fisher 1999: 91); and,

⁴¹ We think that the fuller is the legal equality of human rights, the weaker are the borders between social classes that tend to get disintegrated into smaller and less consolidated groups: strata, factions, *etc.* (for more detail see Grinin 1997b: 61–62).

consequently, the proportion of ‘white collar’ workers grew in the most significant way;

- the increased impact of social legislation and laws, limiting society polarization (high income taxes, inheritance taxes, *etc.*)⁴²; and
- the strengthening of previously insignificant factors, such as gender, age, and professional-group characteristics.

Let us see these transformations in retrospective. Actually, the whole first half of the 20th century can be characterized as a period of struggle for the introduction of the most important social laws. The respective views and ideologies were changed dramatically by the global social and economic events: revolutions, the example of the USSR, the world economic crisis and so on. Sometimes quickly sometimes gradually social policy experienced radical changes. Later this course was strengthened and developed (on this dynamics of social development see Fisher 1999: 335–351). Immense changes took place in the sphere of income redistribution. This was achieved, in particular, through the progressive income taxation (see, *e.g.*, *Ibid.*: 86–87) and social welfare programs for low-income groups. As a result of the development of social programs the taxation rates grew significantly in comparison with the period of classical capitalism (reaching 50 % and more of personal income).⁴³

When in the 1950s and 1960s the USA and a number of European countries became **welfare states / mass consumption societies**, this implied that the mature state had acquired some features that were not typical of its earlier version, and that a new form of state had developed. Since we can observe **the transformation of the mature class state into the mature *social* state, that is the state that actively pursues a policy to provide support for poor, socially unprotected groups and that places limits on the growth of inequality.**

⁴² In the last decades of the 20th century in some developed countries the lower class shrank to 5 %, the upper class constituted less than 5 % of the total population, whereas the rest of the strata could be attributed to the middle or lower-middle classes (see Fisher 1999: 89), whereas in the early 19th century up to two thirds of the total population belonged to the lower class (*Ibid.*).

⁴³ They only began to be reduced since the 1980s in connection with the introduction of the neo-conservatist course (that corrected the previously dominant Keynesian one) into the economic policies of a number of the leading states, such as the USA, Britain and so on. In particular, in the USA in 1986 the upper limit of personal income taxation was reduced from 50 to 28 %, whereas the maximum rate of taxes on the corporations' profits was reduced from 46 to 34 % (Povalikhina 2002: 434).

In the 1960s new changes in all spheres of life (especially in connection with the new [information-scientific] production revolution) began. In particular, one could mention the growth of the role of various non-class social movements in the Western countries (student, youth, race, 'green', women movements, consumers' organizations and so on). The class characteristics became more and more vague, among other things through the dispersion of ownership (see, *e.g.*, Dahrendorf 1976), whereas the social structure became determined more and more not only by economic ownership, but by other parameters, including education and popularity.⁴⁴

Thus, many present-day characteristics of the Western states cannot be regarded as definitely the ones of the mature state. Moreover they have features that are uncharacteristic also of the state as a political organization in general. Especially noteworthy is the extremely important and seemingly strange phenomenon of partially waiving legal sovereign rights. It is also necessary to note the formation of various supranational organizations and the growth of their importance.

That is why there are certain grounds to expect that the end of the period of the mature states is forthcoming, and the world is entering the phase of its new (suprastate and supranational) political organization (for more detail see Grinin 1999a; 2006e: 159–165; 204–206; 234–235; 2008a, 2009a, 2011b).

12. CONCLUDING REMARKS

The fact that our three-stage theory has been suggested as a more acceptable alternative to Claessen – Skalník's two stage scheme was agreed with Henri Claessen himself who with his inherent scholar and human generosity wrote: 'Grinin... goes deeply into the matter, and shows that the dichotomy "early-mature" is an incomplete developmental sequence. According to him there are structural differences between the cases suggested by us, and states with a capitalistic and industrial background (imperial Germany, United States, Russia *etc.*). He therefore proposes a sequence of three types, early states, developed states and mature states. In this way he places a separate category between

⁴⁴ See, *e.g.*, Parsons 1997: 27; Berger 1986; see also our works providing the analysis of the contemporary social processes, in particular those connected with the so-called 'celebrities' (*e.g.*, Grinin 2009i).

the early and the mature state... We greatly appreciate the way in which Grinin augmented and improved our work. With this classification a serious gap in the evolution of the state is closed' (Claessen *et al.* 2008; see also Claessen 2010: 35 *etc.*).

In the 1960s and 1970s, the United States and a number of Western European countries proclaimed themselves welfare states, which actually meant that the mature state was developing into something different. Into what, however?

Concerning the changes of statehood and transformation of national sovereignty in the last decades of the 20th and the early 21st centuries see Chapter 5 (see also Grinin 1999a, 2004b, 2005, 2008a, 2009a, 2011b).