GLOBALIZATION OF SECURITY...
A FOCUS ON RIVAL POWERS IN AFRICA

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The threat posed by insecurities emanating from socio-economic and political outlets both regionally and globally at large remains a subject of contentious debates among international relations scholars. The contemporary factors of insecurity like financial crises and recessions, deadly diseases, terrorism and sectarian violence, cyber attacks, authoritarian rule / bad governance dominate the agenda of international and local actors. Notwithstanding these challenges, there have been consistent efforts by state and international actors to curb these security challenges. In this article, we seek to explore initiatives by the World’s rival powers to institutionalize the attainment of an all-out security agenda, especially for Africa. This is because over the past decade, Africa has seen an unprecedented offer of security measures from these global actors, a move that is characteristic of hegemons, where they maintain a robust security measures externally so as to enhance a domestically balanced security outlook. Our argument is that ‘securitize global’ agenda would be difficult to attain if the regional security, economic and governance dynamics are not adequately monitored and supported. How does a globalized security agenda fit into the African security dynamics? Does Africa pose much threat to global security to warrant such heightened interest? If we take YES for an answer, how do we reconcile this with Africa’s very small or no contribution to environmental security threats?

Keywords: global governance, global security, African security, Africa and global powers.

Introduction
Prior to the post Cold War era, contemporary arguments for the world as a global village were not sound enough because what characterizes periods before and during the Cold War Era was the world divided among two poles, the West and that of the Soviet Block, and the rest of the others constituting ‘Third World’ countries. It was a period of an intense nuclear confrontation which kept the peace and lasted for 45 years. The international political platform was characterized by the respect for territorial integrity together with the principles of sovereign competence and noninterference, but sadly though, this strong international foundation was short-lived as it changed, with the end of the Cold War, especially in relation to ineffective states. Understandably though, while respect for territorial integrity remains strong, with non-interference intact, sovereignty over noninsured nations has been internationally conditioned and compromised. When therefore, international relations scholars broke through to make a sound ‘globalization’ argument, it turned out to be multi-faceted with contending issues such as information technology, transnational crime, infectious diseases, poverty, environmental

problems, political ideology, and economic issues growing rapidly and being interdependent. However, these developments create real possibilities to achieve economic prosperity, spread political freedom, and promote peace. Yet, they are also producing powerful forces of social fragmentation, creating critical vulnerabilities, and sowing the seeds of violence and conflict. Economic crises extend across state borders and are producing global hardships. All these are aspects of what is commonly referred to as ‘globalization’, and have important security implications (see Keohane and Nye 2000; Gilpin 2000). In this paper, we are poised to present critical analysis of the ‘global security’ phenomenon as pursued by the world's rival powers, with a focus on how Africa fits into this agenda. Our conceptualization of rival powers shall be limited to the China-US-EU triangle, and their quest to achieve global security agenda especially in Africa.

Understanding the Global Security Argument

Before thoroughly delving into what the global security argument is all about, we shall briefly trace the period that has characterized the universe as a violent place. The first is the Cold War and its attendant nuclear arm race between the West and the Soviet Union. The second is the Hiroshima and Nagasaki bombings, where just two small crude atom bombs could destroy large modern cities. Immediately after these bombings, these rival powers sought to accelerate mass production of nuclear weapons. Between 1960 and 1980, both the USA and Soviet Union had each accumulated huge stock piles of nuclear weapons. By 1985, the USA had 23,900 while Soviet Union had about 30,000 nuclear stock piles (see Norris and Arkin 1997). In 1960 both the US and USSR had deeply gone into thermonuclear warheads as both powers started developing Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs) and Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missiles (SLBMs), which could be fired from large nuclear-powered submarines when submerged and which were, in theory, impossible to detect and destroy (Polmar 1982). Apart from the military divide, the issues of socio-economic and environmental dynamics were very strong indicators of global divide especially between the rich represented by the rival powers and the poor states that were left to bandwagon. This leads us to the much trumpeted term, ‘Globalization’. Among others, globalization is connected with climate change, and environmental concerns, market economy, peace and security etc., which if not properly managed will have serious consequences on global human security and development. The slightest slip and loss of control of this global security argument and a combination of a deepening socio-economic divide and environmental constraints would result in conflicts that could not be controlled by traditional military approaches especially among the rival powers.

Moreover, although many arguments hold today about the seeming close of gap between the World System core (richest or first world) and periphery (poor third world countries) (see, e.g., Korotayev et al. 2011), African countries are still demonstrating innate inability to match up with the world's advanced economies. There is a conviction that activities like wars, and civil strife, are inhibiting attempts to catch up with the world's rich. Recent research, however, seems to demystify these assertions. Our economies and educational setups are still in their crippling stages thus unquestionably making it impossible to catch up with the advanced economies. Rich in natural resources, and vast fertile land, Africa continue to face food crisis and famine. Which lesson can a poor African country learn from it? These shortcomings indicate that much more socio-political
and economic efforts need to be done by African politicians and researchers if the contin-
ent is to be at equilibrium. Other global security problems of great significance include
desertification and deforestation (environmental security) that have immediate effect in
terms of soil erosion; water quality and shortage, which are severe with around half of
the population of South Asia and Africa lacking access to safe drinking water. In recent
years, we have observed a shift in the security paradigm of the world especially with
the US led invasion into Iraq, Afghanistan and other counter-insurgency operations
in the name of fight against terrorism. In addition, the current economic security agenda
is not delivering sanity, as there are firm indicators of global instability because
of the wealth disparities and limitations to the majority of disempowered by a minority of
the empowered. Because of these adverse actions by the great powers, some 30 to
40 million people are been displaced across boundaries and/or within states as the con-
sequences of global climate change.

Contemporary scholars have argued that the current security agenda for an esti-
mated population of billions of people should seek to maintain and control those global
systems that work continually to the advantage of the few world hegemons (Rogers
2010). In this paper therefore, we seek to argue that the minority elites or hegemons in
their fight to achieve global security will end up losing the security agenda especially
relating to Africa and more so, in the midst of this unequal world, which favours a mi-
nority, thus further increasing the risk of instability and conflict.

Proponents of global security argue that the world is interdependent in diverse areas
such as economic security (financial crisis), infectious diseases, terrorism, security
(weapons of mass destruction and nuclear threat), climate change and the environment,
governance and military conflict; and that its very dynamic nature has moved beyond the
mere protection of a state's territorial integrity and sovereignty to sensitive issues
like inter-state's cohesion in fighting various global vices. A common example to sub-
stantiate this interconnectedness irrespective of geographic or economic status shows
how a poor or ‘failed states’ failure to contain an infectious disease can have a rippling
effect on the lives and security of even the most powerful states. Global security agenda
therefore emphasizes the collective approach to the securitization of the world, espe-
cially when contemporary threats cannot be contained within national boundaries.
The key components of the global security agenda that will be discussed in this paper
include: Environment, Energy and Economic Security, Terrorism and Weapons of Mass
 Destruction (WMDs), and Global Governance.

On the global political stage, concerns to address inter-continental issues like Ter-
rorism, Weapons of Mass Destructons and Nuclear weapons, Good Governance, Cor-
rupion, Cyber and Military Security, and Pandemics have had far reaching implications
especially in relations to Africa. Unquestionably, the fight against Terrorism, WMDs
and Nuclear Weapons requires a shifting balance between its threats and root causes to
its existence. This is so because concerted efforts by global powers to conduct their war
on terror, have conversely posed a bigger threat to global security than the problem it is
meant to address. The basis for this broad assumption of mine is that if nuclear weapons
did not exist, they could not proliferate; because they do, they will. As long as any
country has them, others will want them. As long as they exist, they will be used one
day again, by design, accident or miscalculation. We must make the transition from
a world in which the role of nuclear weapons is seen as central to maintaining national
and international security, to one where they become progressively marginal and eventually entirely unnecessary. Without undermining terrorism as a serious global security threat, I am tempted to argue that its risky nature cannot be overgeneralised. Among the poorest of the poor especially in Africa, the fear of being attacked by terrorists or WMDs is far removed from the pervasive reality. Rather, what is characteristic of these poor settings revolves around hunger, malnutrition, lack of safe drinking water and sanitation, diseases, and affordable health care. These societal vices kill millions of Africans every year. Therefore, and especially in the case of deadly diseases, the lack of border defences to protect neighbouring states, especially in terms of movement of refugees, normal travellers, soldiers, traders, tourists, further enhances diseases to cross borders free of passport regulations. This is the same scenario for HIV/AIDS, which shows a world united by contagion. HIV/AIDS alone has the potential of being an economic, communal, national and international security challenge. Economically, 10 per cent HIV/AIDS prevalence has the potential of reducing national income by one-third, and damages communal security by collapsing national social institutions. This leads us into the international challenge, where a disintegration of one state has a potential of across border implications for neighbouring countries through economic dislocation, refugee flow etc. This is one more reason why pandemic should become a global security concern. Cyber attacks on the other hand, are a relatively new field and have grown to be the most contemporary security threat that global powers especially China and the USA are fighting to dominate. It is a digital technology aimed at instituting measures both technical and non-technical with the express purpose of protecting computers, networks, software, and data bases (see World Summit on the Information Society in 2005). Among the global rival powers, the USA for example, sees cyber threat as one of the most serious economic and national security challenges they face as a nation, with economic prosperity in the 21st century dependent on it.

Environmental security emphasizes the threat posed by environmental events as well as the impacts of human conflict and inter-state relations on the environment. Put simply, it reflects the ability of a nation or society to withstand environmental asset scarcity, environmental risks or adverse changes, or environment-related tensions or conflicts (Chalecki 2002). Securing the environment therefore is an important dimension is achieving global peace because of its inter-connection among the natural resource base, social fabric of a state, and the economic engine of local, regional and international stability. Damage to the environment can aggravate land, water and food insecurities which can influence citizens to rise against their governments. These environmental risks and/or threats are often man made, like, deforestation, fouling the air, water (pollution), and overharvesting our land.

Economic security is a core component of the global security agenda. Accordingly, it emphasizes a stable income or other resources to support a standard of living for both short and long term purposes, job security, ‘the establishment of simple, transparent regulatory systems to create a more level playing field for the private sector demopolization; stronger banking systems that protect savings of small depositors; reductions in unproductive government spending, such as costly military build-ups; higher spending on primary health care and education; adequate social protection for the poor, the unemployed, and other vulnerable groups; and environmental protection; greater transparency and accountability in government and corporate affairs; and a more effective dialogue with labor and the rest of civil society’ (Ouattara 1998). For developing countries,
such as China, economic security is best defined as the ability to provide a steady increase in the standard of living for the whole population through national economic development while maintaining economic independence. In other words, there are two sides to the economic security ‘coin’: competitiveness and independent economic sovereignty. The purpose of competition is to ensure a healthy development, penetrate international markets, while autonomy is to guard against external influence and shows the level of control a country should have over its development (Romm 1993).

Africa and the Global Security Initiative

Like any other concept of the 21st century, achieving a global security agenda remains a herculean task. Africa, a continent plagued by poverty and civil unrest has had to contend with challenges such as corruption, internal displacement and refugees, malnutrition, HIV/AIDS, unimaginably low/poor Standard of income; poor economic base etc. Poverty and/or Corruption remain the core virus destroying all attempts at achieving good governance especially in Africa. More than half a million women die every year in pregnancy and childbirth, 99% of this figure found in Africa. This failure in health exacerbates poverty, and it is a failure not of science but of policy, politics and governance. These threats to human survival are warranting economic giants and multilateral organizations like the UN, World Bank, World Health Organizations etc. to double their aid assistance to Africa.

In the recently concluded G20 summit (November 2010) the world's two leading powers (the USA and China), who coincidentally are the highest polluters of the environment, resolved on efforts to reduce the level of pollution and global warming. The inevitable question is Does Africa fit into the problem of global warming or pollution? The problem of global warming is been created by the developed countries who have deeper carbon footprints and greater financial and technological capabilities for mitigation and adaptation. Their per capita emissions are substantially higher than that of developing countries, with an American emitting fifteen times as much CO2 as an Indian. Unfortunately, the deadly impacts of climate change – with regard to weather extremes, natural and environmental disasters, rising sea levels and food and water scarcities – will not be distributed in proportion to those responsible for global warming. The poorest like Africa will suffer the most. These new challenges are those of the Global Environmental Change (GEC) but our focus and analysis goes a little beyond just environmental change dynamics, rather we seek to explore its ‘securitize’ nature. The ‘Securitization’ (Weaver 1995) of GEC has fundamentally differed and prevented so far effective global counter measures to adapt to and mitigate against the consequences of this new security threat where the enemy is us: Our production and consumption patterns as well as our way of life (see Brauch 2008). Designing therefore a global security agenda for a continent of over 40 states would mean not only acknowledging the shift that is taking place in how general global security is being conceived; but it also raises a series of policy dilemmas.

Of greater significance, Western powers continue to speak behind the diplomatic mask of a desire to save Africa from the grips of vices such as poverty, malnutrition and diseases, drug and crime, bad governance, terrorism, and a retrogressive economic base as strong motivations for their desire to ‘securitize’ the continent. How is the African continent a threat or active perpetrator of global terrorism? How many countries in Africa have WMDs or nuclear weapons? Apparently none of them do have WMDs or nu-
clear weapons. Over the past decade, issues like weapons proliferation, Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMDs), cyber attacks, ethnic violence, drug trafficking, characterizing not only Western socio-political and economic order, are rarely evident in Africa. Yet, Africa, a continent that is far from the USA, and China, is strategically on their global security agenda. Therefore, for WMDs in Africa, because they do not exist there, they cannot proliferate and since no one sub-region has it, the remaining regions will not desire them. Conversely, the renewed security interest in Africa cannot just be viewed from a proliferation view point like efforts to curb the WMDs, but rather to its nonproliferation aspects too, like domestic and international security mechanism, multilateral export control measures, arms control and enforcement measures, intelligence surveillance and tracking operations, military and other forms of interdiction. The other serious governance issue of serious security concern is that of cyber security which unquestionably is not native to Africa. Since it is explicit that maximizing national security as a motivation may not be appropriate for developing nations in Africa, such developing countries possess neither robust critical infrastructure that utilizes digital control system, nor highly digitalized militaries. Thinking therefore of a sustained interest in developing African countries therefore may not make sense, especially when internet penetration for Africa is far behind that of the rest of the world... just under 36 per cent.

Only the Northern region of Africa is advancing rapidly in the area of ICT infrastructure development. Egypt and Morocco are among the top three African states. There are States with the highest internet traffic, with Algeria and Tunisia not far behind. Out of seven, one (Tunisia) has a functional CERT and another that is non-functional. Only Egypt has formal legislation against cyber-crimes and a public key infrastructure, while Morocco has legislation in progress.

In Central Africa, its vast geography makes it impossible for successful ICT operations, as only three out of nine have made public efforts regarding cyber security. Only Angola has legislation on cyber crimes, while two countries (Cameroon via The National Agency for Information Technology [ATIC] and the DRC) have legislation in progress. Conversely in the Southern African community, the Republic of South Africa has the highest rate of internet users partially due to its advanced infrastructural setup. In the East, out of 17 countries, only two have legislations against cyber crimes (Mauritius and Zambia), while Kenya, Uganda, and Tanzania have legislation in progress. West Africa has three countries (Liberia, Nigeria and Niger) out of sixteen that have cyber security legislations, with Senegal in progress (see Cole et al. 2008).

Judging from the data, it is clear that the vast majority of nation states in Africa are doing nothing about cyber security, and that even those who have are only concentrating on cyber crime legislation alone. Although Nigeria stands prominent as one of the world's famous in terms of cyber crime, its proportion cannot be compared to the high level of phishing that takes place in China, the USA or Europe. It therefore presupposes that while African nations recognize the significance of cyber security, an uncertainty exist regarding how and where it is needed whose responsibility it should be, the state or private sector led? Already Africa and their greedy leaders are facing multifaceted problems like corruption, poverty, pandemic, civil unrests; thus to concentrate on a concept of cyber security that they do not see helping their national security and political gains might just be seen as a mere waste of time.

In the economic sphere, globalizing security in relation to Africa from her Western and Asian rivals poses some serious challenges. As has been mentioned above, eco-
omic security emphasizes competitiveness and economic independence, arguing that
competition ensures a healthy development, while autonomy is to guard against external
influence and shows the level of control a country should have over its development.
For Africa, it is almost impossible for the two scenarios to exist. What is there to com-
pete and with whom? To the Chinese, economic security means the ability to provide
a steady increase in the standard of living for the whole population through national
economic development while maintaining economic independence. What is absent in
Africa in the first place is the will (both political and socio-economic) to create a plat-
form of steady growth in the living standards for the people. The inability to provide
this basic human need in fact further makes us more over-reliant, hence our inability to
be economically autonomous. On their part, the various rival powers are taking differ-
ent approaches to solve Africa's economic problems, which are even making the equa-
tion worse, because of their complex and varied nature. Which approach is more plausi-
ble? Ironically, China which wants competitiveness and autonomy domestically to en-
sure economic security, is doing just the reverse in that their approach to various foreign
nations in Africa all in the name of untied grants and aid. Their approach is very direct
with the politicians who like their investors do not carry an economic security lens.

The West, on the other hand, has opined that greater portions of economic security
are accrued from worldwide expansion of trade, unlimited availability of FDI, and easy
movement of private capital across borders, but however cautiously notes that such
form of globalization could be counterproductive with economic problems like unem-
ployment, local resentments arising from perceptions of economic disparities and eco-
omic or financial crises (see Destler and Balint 1999; World Bank 2000; Shaw 1999;
Dollar and Kraay 2001). Because of the attendant effects of the threats of globalizing
security for concerns like unemployment emanating from economic hardship, and percep-
tions of relative deprivation among unemployed youths who are adequately armed
with much information technologies, threat to such economic security increases with
high impact on international stability (Wade 2001). Interestingly, what distinguishes
the two rivals is that while China emphasizes on a soft power approach in enhancing
a securitized agenda for Africa focusing mainly on economic approach, the USA uses
a combination of both hard and soft power approach. China even at the UN Security
Council, prefers discussions and solutions to Africa's conflict/crisis through diplomatic
means and by cooperating with all parties, a position they emphasized at the Beijing
2006 FOCCA summit. Even where it is to contribute to peace keeping in Africa, China
had before now only pledged logistical support and not combatants (Wei 2010). In addi-
tion to soft power outlook, China has provided over $1 billion in cash to the AU to sup-
port Peace keeping missions in Sudan, $300,000 for the AU’s peace keeping mission in
2008 and an additional check of $400,000 in 2009 (Wei 2010). Unfortunately, while the
soft power approach had favorably worked for China, it is now contemplating on hard
power especially in its involvement in Somalia and to some extent Sudan. The world
knows about China insistence on their non-interference and state sovereignty issues;
therefore for the Chinese Chief of General Staff (Chen Bingde) of the People's Libera-
tion Army to have suggested that the international coalition (China inclusive) should
patrol the Gulf of Aden and the waters off the coast of Somalia and take decisive action
against pirate by moving beyond the ocean and crashing the bases of the pirates on the
land indicates a strong resolve to resort to military intervention which is tantamount to
a ground war in a foreign country and contrasts China's foreign policy (Tharoor 2011).
The European Union is equally a big power that desires to achieve a 'securitized' order for the African continent. For the purpose of this paper, we shall look at the EU as an institution that personifies its member nation states. The broad policy objective for African security was designed in the EU’s African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA), which can be defined as ‘a complex of norms, capacities, structures and procedures established in order to enable the AU carry out its new task in the field of peace and security’ (Pirozzi 2006). To actualize APSA objectives, the EU while commending domestic African efforts at consolidating regional integration and developing common security mechanism for the prevention, management and conflict resolution, admits that these efforts and their implementation are hampered by a series of contradictions. The main gap discovered therefore in these domestic African efforts revolves around the requisite finances needed for training and capacity building which not only requires the EU spending seed money on the African Union initiatives, but the transfer of expertise and know-how. At the request of various African leaders, the EU in 2004 implemented the African Peace Facility (APF), a EUR 250 million, three-year instrument designed to support peace, security and development. Although the programme was intended to be a short-term measure, when it ended in 2007 it was renewed until 2010 with a further infusion of EUR 300 million (see Pirozzi 2009). With these EU interventions in achieving African security, the challenging questions could be to what extent have these EU interventions been effective, and were they strategic enough to achieve security? Was the APSA initiative in consultation with sovereign states of Africa or it was just the usual supply driven intervention? Understanding the answers to these questions would lead us in determining whether the recipient African states were strong or weak enough for the huge financial investment especially when ‘state weakness remains the principal source of insecurity in Africa’ (Pirozzi 2006).

Unlike the two powers mentioned (China and the wider EU) whose security outlook for Africa is supported using soft power agents, their USA counterpart is a combination of both. Unquestionably, the Interdependence Theory offers an appreciable explanation for the United States major security approach towards the African continent otherwise known as the ‘African Command’ (AFRICOM) propounded by Bush administration in 2007. The creation of AFRICOM ‘acknowledges the emerging strategic importance of Africa, recognizing that peace and stability on the continent impact not only Africans, but the interests of the U.S. and international community as well’. The mission statement in the words of Secretary of States for defense reads:

United States Africa Command, in concert with other U.S. government agencies and international partners, conducts sustained security engagement through military-to-military programs, military-sponsored activities, and other military operations as directed to promote a stable and secure African environment in support of U.S. foreign policy (see Mission statement approved by the Secretary of Defense May 2008).

But why is the US security approach that different from the EU, and China etc.? Is the concept of global security only limited to military presence on a foreign land? This unexplained aspect of the US security agenda for Africa has generated lots of criticisms from African scholars who see the US security ‘from a distance’ as a strong threat to national sovereignty and security. Our use of sovereignty is not only limited to the
physical control of a country's jurisdiction, but rather we seek to posit that because of the weak economic institutional base, state sovereignty which would emphasize domestic control is about to be lost to the foreign powers through their continuous influence in the domestic economies and politics of African countries. This in turn has the potential of undermining national political control and cohesion. The bigger the muscles of these foreign powers in Africa, the lesser the control of state jurisdiction and political economy by local leaders. Recent Regime change initiative fueled by the West in instituting liberal political order by removing Africa's long serving leaders coupled with the huge donor budgetary support to some African national economies is a strong indication of a gradual loss of grip on national sovereignty by Africans to foreign powers. This steadily growing influence therefore makes it difficult to attempt to offer any African position on environmental, security, economic and/or political sovereignty. AFRICOM itself is not a specific objective of the US military but remain a foreign policy initiative designed by the White House. Like a typical realist state masking behind a liberalist face, although the US keeps amplifying their AFRICOM initiative as purely to defend Africa, it remains uncontested that the real initiative is for other selfish purposes. When the Cold War was over, the US wanted to concentrate on domestic development but certain moves led them to think otherwise. The US Ambassador, Holmes addressing diplomats in Liberia in October, 2010, confirmed the USA's personalization and how they intend to make Africa different from how it was before their intervention in security terms (see AFRICOM 2010). There could probably be no other convincing justification for such a coordinated security interest although like Holmes mentioned, there are other new approaches to the African Command namely the 3D: Development, Diplomacy and Defense to mitigate the new security threats in Africa and the ineffectiveness of domestic African efforts to address them.

Conclusion

Acknowledging the multifaceted security interest and approach from rival global powers to securitize Africa, the following points are worth outlining. In the first place, this work does not undermine the ‘global security argument generally’ as baseless in relation to Africa. Recognizing other major components of the argument like economic security, environmental and climate security, security in health, anti-terrorism, food security etc., we do agree that some of these initiatives can be possibly applicable in Africa, but some more strategic ones will be achieved at a much later dates in history. Africa's attainment of economic security is still in its imaginative stage and will be practically impossible to attain now and more so if we are to note competitiveness and autonomy as core guidelines to a steady economic security. The various and complex governance dynamics of member sovereign states are not committed in practicalizing the achievement of a sound economic security, and worse of it, these foreign powers rarely consult with the private sector. Any attempt to look at African security from a holistic approach will be time wasting because the various units of security approaches are not only complex and interdependent, but differ from those of the West and East. If a liberal political and economic autonomy is to be achieved, individual African states should be allowed to sincerely lead their own domestic matters by instituting good governance with African characteristics and not so much by Western dictates. If 'security gives way to conspiracy' (see Shakespear's play, Macbeth 1603) then these supply driven security
initiatives from rival global powers both in soft and hard power should be cautiously checked for fear of a conspiracy game to milk away Africa's resources. The present famine in Somalia and pandemics in other parts of Africa, suggests that nothing significant has been achieved in global health and food security. On non-traditional security issues like terrorism, drug and human trafficking, crime, etc. Africa, though not any serious target, and for fear of a possible log rolling effect should readily join the fight against these global vices. This is because Africa does not really pose that giant security threat to global co-existence but rather terrorist activities that may have taken place in some African countries like Sudan, Kenya etc. were in response to the excesses of these Western powers. Let the global security initiative be tailored to individual regional and/or continental dynamic, because a one-fit-all approach to securitize the world might just not be achievable in Africa. Undoubtedly, because Africa is not a ‘competing power’ for world resources, it may not pose any serious threat to the global security concept. Frantic efforts by China should be done to ensure that soft power inducements to influence African politicians are actually geared towards competitiveness and autonomy and not merely helping politicians fulfill their manifestoes. By doing so, they would have helped the continent to achieve economic security. The USA, on the other, should fine-tune the hard power approach. It is no secret that the establishment of the AFRICOM standby force is to rapidly respond to regimes that do not conform to Western liberal standards. Continental security cannot be achieved by going stricto-senso by the USA way. Domestic resistance will continue especially when the China factor is gaining grounds. Let us help secure Africa by empowering Africans do it the African way and not by imported parameters.

To remedy these galloping strategies to securitize Africa, and considering that the stage is not fully prepared for an active African participation in contributing to the global security agenda, because of weak economic infrastructural base, bad governance etc., it therefore behooves all sovereign nations to pursue a sincere approach in addressing economic growth. This is because attaining this economic security lays the foundation for the attainment of the other security components. On their part, global rival powers should realize that approaching global security initiative from uncoordinated approaches characterized by relative gains mentality will only fuel global divide and the impossibility of attaining world security. The USA, China, the EU and other powers, should put aside their ideological and political differences and take a concerted approach in achieving global security. Anything short of this will rather enhance global insecurity.

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