

Introduction

Social phenomena and processes can be analyzed in various ways among which the method of studying certain dimensions of social reality is hardly the leading one. This is especially the case when one deals with long historical periods. In the present monograph this particular method is applied (of course, alongside with many others). Here some macrohistorical trends as well as the aspects of globalization are considered in tight interrelation.

Macrohistory is history on the large scale, sometimes telling the story of whole civilizations, sometimes of the entire world (Reilly 1999), but sometimes of particular dimensions of historical process. For the present study we choose three aspects of macrohistory, namely, technological and political aspects, as well as the one of historical personality. Taken together they give a definite picture of unfolding macrohistorical processes from the beginning of formation of human society to the near future. They also show the scales and circumstances when certain driving forces of history come to the foreground. The technological aspect analyzed in Chapter 1 demonstrates the most important stages of production forces' development and the greatest production and technological revolutions that took place in history. On this large scale it becomes especially evident that, using Fernand Braudel's words (1993: 67), 'in reality, everything rested upon the very broad back of material life; when material life expanded, everything moved ahead'. That is why the distinguishing of the greatest productive/technological revolutions also allows setting a periodization of historical process in general. However, a relevant dominance of technology can be recognized only within very large time spans and strict limits. Chapter 2 which analyzes the historical personality's aspect of macrohistory aims at demonstrating that any analysis of history is unthinkable without consideration of the role of the Great men and other historical persons capable to change substantially the course of events in certain circumstances. Although it has become quite a common idea that it is just people who make history, nevertheless the interest to the individual's opportunities and ways to influence the choice of historical alternatives

significantly decreased. In our opinion, this is unjustified and wrongful especially in the present period when the scale of influence of different agents empowered with certain opportunities greatly increases.

Chapter 3 considers the development of the political constituent of macrohistory. It goes without saying that the state is the most important organization created by people. Within the state the whole great historical experience is accumulated, the state is an integral institution allowing an estimation of any developmental aspect: from economic to ethnical, from demographic to cultural. The analysis of state formation and its evolutionary stages is all the more important as in the age of globalization one observes certain symptoms of the statehood decay (which is discussed in Chapter 5).

The second part of the monograph is dedicated to the process of globalization. It consists of just two chapters. But still it covers three aspects: political, economic and futurological. Actually it is very important not only to consider the present situation but also to look into the future (although at the risk of making a mistake). We present our idea of the world prospective political and in some respects social-economic development basing on the analysis of macrohistory and contemporary globalization processes. In Chapter 1 of the monograph we also give a forecast of the productive forces development in the nearest decades.

The combination in the title of the monograph of the two terms – *macrohistory and globalization* – is in no way artificial. On the contrary, the connection of these terms is organic at least as the real goal of macrohistory is to find meaning in the past so as to create new possibilities of meaning for the future (Galtung and Inayatullah 1997). It is worth dwelling on the value of combining in one book the large-scale historical or macrohistorical processes with globalization trends. First of all, it is important to show the way the transition to modern processes has taken place. To reveal such a link was one of the monograph's goals. In particular, we have tried to show the way the weak archaic state transformed first into the centralized developed state, then into the mature industrial one and after that how it changed into the mature *social* state. And further we demonstrate why having reached its golden age, in the situation of economic globalization the state as an institute undergoes a significant transformation and loses its sovereignty. No less important is the analysis of the emergence of industrial productive forces. And further, why this led to the appearance of the cyclic devel-

opment of economy (medium-term business cycles), to the emergence of recurrent economic crises. Finally, to what extent does the modern global crisis resemble or differ from previous crises?

Today it is clear that it is very productive to search for the origins of globalization in the depths of history. It is no coincidence at all that the growing interest in globalization has promoted interest in the trend often denoted as ‘historical dimension of globalization’. Among such movements it is most worth noting *Global History* whose heart and novelty, according to Bruce Mazlish and Akira Iriye (Mazlish, Iriye 2005: 19), is history of globalization. We contend that in a certain sense almost the whole World History can be regarded as a history of movement toward the increasing size of social systems, their integration, and globalization in general. Hereby, in history and sociology the investigation is broadening with respect to the historical development of globalization processes (see Grinin 2011b, 2011c; Grinin, Korotayev 2009a, 2009b). As is known, there is quite a heated debate on the question when globalization started. Whether it has been going on since the 3rd millennium BC (when according to Andre Gunder Frank the World System emerged [Frank 1990, 1993; Frank, Gills 1993]), or during the so-called Axial Age (Jaspers 1953) in the 1st millennium BC, or only from the Great Geographical Discoveries, or in the 19th century, or after the year 1945, or only in the late 1980s. Each of these dates has its own sense. It is quite reasonable to discuss the problem in the context of whether one can speak about globalization (basing on the semantics of the term ‘global’ itself) before the start of the Great Geographical Discoveries, as a result of which the idea of the Earth as a globe exceeded the limits of the opinion of a group of scientists and became practical knowledge (Chumakov 2009).

But, notwithstanding this point of view, there is no doubt that historical dimension of globalization is quite challenging (for more detail see Grinin 2011f). And that is why the search for new aspects of organic link between macrohistorical trends and contemporary globalization processes is both necessary and potentially fruitful.¹

¹ The correlation between macrohistory and globalization allows also a better understanding of the relationship between globalization as a set of contemporary complex processes and global studies (*globalistics*) as a branch of knowledge about global phenomena and processes (see, e.g., Ilyin 2009).

In connection with already mentioned Global History which gains in popularity, it is worth mentioning that, on the one hand, macrohistory is tightly connected with it by the scale as well as by the absence of reference to certain national histories and – in the contemporary context – by tight association with globalization. From this point Global History serves as a peculiar variant of macrohistory since Global History goes back to the works of classics of macrohistory and World System approach of the second half of the 20th century: Braudel, Wallerstein, Arrighi and others. But on the other hand, macrohistory is a certain conceptualization of historical process. In this respect it is close rather to the theory of history than to Global History.² The latter more often presents an attempt of a broad historical investigation, although often based on more or less clear theory, but, on the whole, Global History is a meta-narrative capable to meet the demands of the globalizing world (O'Brien 2006: 3; see also Berg 2008; Crossley 2008).

* * *

All the ideas presented in the monograph have already been expressed in a number of the author's articles. These articles when revised into chapters have obtained inner integrity and cohesion. As has been already said the monograph consists of two parts.

Part I '**The Macrohistory Surveys**' consists of three chapters.

Chapter 1 *Production Revolutions and Periodization of History: A Comparative and Theoretic-Mathematical Approach* regards the major qualitative stages of development of the world productive forces. For the reason of detection of such stages and the most successful analysis of them we have proposed the term the *production principle*. We single out four production principles: 1. Hunter-Gatherer; 2. Craft-Agrarian; 3. Industrial; 4. Information-Scientific. The change in production principles is connected with the three greatest technological breakthroughs,

² On the relation between macrohistory and theory of history see, for example, Galtung and Inayatullah 1997; Reilly 1999; Little 1998, 2000a, 2000b. However, it is already evident from the recommended reference list on macrohistory that includes in particular *Shapes of Philosophical History* by Frank E. Manuel (1965); *The Shapes of Time* by Peter Munz (1977); *The Rise of the West: A History of the Human Community* by William H. McNeill (1963); *The Great Divergence: China, Europe, and the Making of the Modern World Economy* by Kenneth Pomeranz (2000); *The Sources of Social Power* by Michael Mann (1986, 1993); *Civilization and Capitalism, 15th – 18th Century*, Vols I–III by Fernand Braudel (1982); *ReORIENT: Global Economy in the Asian Age* by Andre Gunder Frank (1998); *The European Miracle: Environments, Economies and Geopolitics in the History of Europe and Asia* by E. L. Jones (1981) etc.

which are denoted as production revolutions: the Agrarian (or the 'Neolithic'), the Industrial and the Information-Scientific ones. The idea of production revolutions has been discussed for quite a long time, however, without being conceptualized. In the chapter we have developed a theory of production revolution. On the base of the theory of production revolution and production principles we suggest a model of periodization of historical process. The starting point of the production revolutions can be regarded as a convenient and natural point from which the chronology of formation change can be established. Thus, Chapter 1 is devoted to the historical process as a whole, considered with respect to its periodization which allows revealing its structure. We also demonstrate some possibilities of mathematical modeling for the problems concerning the periodization of the world historical process. In this chapter we also propose a number of forecasts relating to the forthcoming decades including the start and development of the second phase of the Information-Scientific Revolution.

Chapter 2 *The Role of Individual in History* is devoted to the significant at all times and sounding anew in every epoch problem of the role of an individual (also a Hero, Great Man, agent/agency) in history. The issue of the role of an individual in history is among the most important within the framework of philosophy and theory of history. It is argued that in the age of globalization, when the humankind has found itself at a new developmental turning point there is an urgent necessity to return to the analysis of this issue. In the first section the retrospective analysis of views on this problem from the antiquity to contemporary counterfactual history is considered. In the second section the author aims at the analysis of the set of factors affecting the role of individuals as a conceptual system. We suggest that depending on various conditions and circumstances and with the account of specific features of historical place and time and personal characteristics, the historical role of an individual may fluctuate from the absolutely invisible up to the greatest one. A conclusion is made that the weaker and less stable is a society, the more destroyed are the old structures, the greater may be the personality's impact. In other words, the role of an agent is inversely correlated with society's stability and strength. The chapter presents the model which takes into account four phases of a society's evolutionary dynamics: 1) stable society of the monarchic/dictatorial type; 2) social pre-revolutionary crisis; 3) revolution; 4) creation of a new order. It is shown that a personality's greatest influ-

ence is observed at the third and fourth stages, while at the first stage the influence is usually considerably weaker.

Chapter 3 *The Evolution of Statehood* considers the political dimension of the historical process. The power emerges together with human society. However, the political power was institutionalized within human societies much later. In the hunter-gatherer societies this institutionalization was still absent. Only with the emergence of agriculture and large demographic shifts following the agrarian revolution there appeared the conditions for the emergence of more or less separate political sub-systems. During the very prolonged late archaic and early civilization periods one could observe the separation of political sphere from society including the beginning of specialization in the field of political management which in fact can be considered as the origin of politogenesis. The first medium complexity polities (chiefdoms and their analogues) emerged. The transition to statehood appears to be one of the most crucial changes in the human historical development. There are many uncertainties concerning the state despite the seemingly high degree of knowledge about this institution. Scientists are at variance on how and when it emerged, on the criteria that distinguish it from pre-state and non-state formations. The chapter presents a new approach to the causes and models of the emergence of the state. The matter is that within the politogenesis process in addition to the state formation one could also observe the formation of polities which were comparable with the early state in their complexity level and the fulfilled functions, but still lacked a number of early states attributes. We denote such polities as *early state analogues*. In this chapter we also consider conditions of formation of early states and their analogues in connection with the polities' size, their ecological and social environment.

The view of evolution as a multilineal process provides a clue to the understanding of the evolutionary stages passed by the state. The chapter presents the general evolutionary scheme of statehood and new models of state's evolution. Instead of a two-stage model by Claessen and Skalnik *early state – mature state* (1978d, 1981) which ignores the principal differences between the states of pre-industrial and industrial epochs, we propose a three-stage model of the evolution of state: *early state – developed state – mature state*. Yet, not all the early states but only a small part of them were able to transform into developed ones; far from all the developed states managed to transform into mature ones.

Early states are insufficiently centralized states with underdeveloped bureaucracy, their flourishing took place in the period of Ancient World history and the most part of the Middle Ages. *The developed states* are centralized estate-corporative and bureaucratic states of the Late Antiquity, Middle Ages and Early Modern Age. *The mature states* are the states of the industrial epoch with rational type of law and government where the classes of industrial society and modern type of nation have formed. However, when in the 1950s and 1960s the USA and a number of European countries became to transform into welfare states/mass consumption societies; this means the process of changing of the mature class state into the mature *social* state. Later, when in the 1980s and 1990s globalization became much stronger, the mature social state began to develop into something different. However into what? This will be discussed in Chapter 5.

Part II '**Globalization: Economic and Political Aspects**' consists of two chapters (4 and 5) analyzing the economic and political dimensions of globalization respectively.

Chapter 4 *Economic Aspects of Globalization*³ discusses modern industrial economy which from the moment of its emergence in the 19th century and till the present days is exposed to cyclicity not only at the scale of a separate society but also at the level of global economy as a whole. The latter leads to the unevenness of development and heavy recessions. In this chapter we provide a detailed qualitative description of macroeconomic dynamics at every phase of the economic cycle; we specify the driving forces of cyclical dynamics and causes of transition from one phase to another (including psychological causes); a particular attention is paid to the turning point from the peak of overheating to the acute crisis, as well as to the turning point from the downswing to recovery.

Chapter 4 is divided in two sections: *The Theory of Economic Cycles and Current Global Crisis* and *The Global Financial System: Pros and Cons*.

The first section of Chapter 4 presents an analysis and verbal model of medium-term business cycles (with a characteristic period of 7–11 years) known as Juglar cycles. The model takes into account a number of approaches to the analysis of such cycles; in the meantime it also

³ The chapter has been written in cooperation with Andrey Korotayev.

takes into account some of the authors' own generalizations and additions that are important for understanding the internal logic of the cycle, its variability and its peculiarities in the present-time conditions. The authors argue that the most important cause of cyclical crises stems from strong structural disproportions that develop during economic booms. These are not only disproportions between different economic sectors, but also disproportions between different societal subsystems; at present these are also disproportions within the World System as a whole.

We suggest that the current crisis turns out to be rather similar to classical Juglar crises; however, there is also a significant difference, as the current crisis occurs at a truly global level. Yet, due to this truly global scale of the current crisis, the possibilities of regulation with the national state's measures have turned out to be ineffective, whereas the supranational regulation of financial processes hardly exists. It is shown that all that has led to the reproduction of the current crisis following the classical Juglar scenario.

The second section of Chapter 4 analyzes the global causes of the contemporary crisis and the possibilities to eliminate the most acute problems that have generated this crisis. It analyzes both the negative role of the world financial flows and their important positive functions including the 'insurance' of social guarantees on the global scale. On the one hand, anarchic and extremely rapid development of new financial centers and financial flows contributed to the outbreak of the global financial-economic crisis. The latter was amplified by the non-transparency of many financial instruments, which led to the actual concealment of risks and their global underestimation. On the other hand, new financial technologies decrease risks in a rather effective way, they expand possibilities to attract and accumulate enormous capitals, actors, and markets. The modern financial sector also contributes to the provision of insurance for social funds at the global scale. The participation of pension and insurance funds in financial operations leads to the globalization of social sphere. Countries poor in capital, but with large cohorts of young population, are involved more and more in a very important (though not quite apparent) process of supporting the elderly portion of the population in the West through the vigorous unification of the world's financial flows, their standardization, and by their increasing global mobility and anonymity.

Chapter 5 *Political Aspects of Globalization* is also divided in two sections. In the first – *Why do States Lose their Sovereignty in the Age*

of Globalization? – we discuss an interesting problem tightly connected with the globalization issue: why states lose their sovereignty and why they voluntarily renounce their sovereign prerogatives.

The process of globalization undoubtedly contributes to the change and reduction of the scope of state sovereign powers. Much has been said about the ways globalization strengthens the factors that objectively weaken the countries' sovereignty. The list of threats to state sovereignty often includes global financial flows, multinational corporations, global media empires, the Internet *etc.* and, of course, international interventions, as we have recently seen in Libya. At the same time (note that this point is debated surprisingly little and occasionally), since the end of World War II, increasingly more states have been willingly and consciously limiting their sovereign rights, including the rights: to determine the size of taxes and duties, to emit money, the right of supreme jurisdiction, the right to use capital punishment, to proclaim certain political freedoms or to limit them, to establish fundamental election rules *etc.* So there is no doubt that today the completely free and independent countries' sovereignty has become much smaller. And what is extremely important, many countries quite often give away a part of their sovereign powers voluntarily indeed. In our opinion, *the factor of voluntariness in reducing one's own authority is, no doubt, the most important one in understanding the future of the state.*

What stands behind voluntary self-limitation of sovereignty prerogatives? There are several reasons for such voluntariness and 'altruism', including the fact that such a restriction becomes profitable, as in return the countries expect to gain quite real advantages especially as members of regional and interregional unions. Besides, the world public opinion must be pointed out as an important cause of sovereignty reduction: the wider is the circle of countries voluntarily limiting their sovereignty the more inferior appear those states, which do not make such restrictions.

However, it is worth noting that the voluntary reduction of sovereignty is more characteristic of Western countries. The transformation of sovereignty in countries with different cultural traditions proceeds with more difficulty and also is closely connected with the level of economic development. *Nevertheless, the transformation of sovereignty proceeds in this or that way almost in all countries.*

The second section – *On the Way to Global Society: The Coming Epoch of New Coalitions* – is devoted to the analysis of probable future

transformations in relation to the crisis and to the estimation of socio-economic and political advance of the world within the forthcoming decades.

In this section within the framework of the analyses of the future development of the World System we attempt to answer the following questions: What are the implications of the economic weakening of the USA as the World System center? Will the future World System have a leader? Will it experience a global governance deficit? Will the world fragmentation increase? We analyze some crucial events of the present, which could be regarded as precursors of forthcoming fundamental changes. In particular, it is shown that the turbulent events of late 2010 and 2011 in the Arab World may well be regarded as a start of the global reconfiguration. We consider some global scenarios of the World System's near future. During the struggle for a place in organizing and operating the new world order, an epoch of new coalitions will come, which will outline the contours of a new political landscape for a considerably long period. These will be such changes that could prepare the world to the transition to a new phase of globalization (it will be a great success if this is the phase of sustainable globalization) whose contours are not clear yet.

In the section the conclusion is made that although the national state will remain the leading player in the world scene for a long time, we suppose that in the long term the tendency to transform national sovereignty will grow. Of course, this is not a one-side tendency. For instance, the current world crisis shows that a 'renaissance' of the state's role is quite probable in the near future. We are on the eve of a very complex, contradictory, and long process of the formation of a new world order; the state will not disappear within it, but its features and functions will change significantly.

Acknowledgments

The author would like to express his deep gratitude to Elena Emanova and Kseniya Biryukova for their irreplaceable assistance in the process of preparation of this monograph.