

# Essay on the New Globalization

*Endre Kiss*

*In the neoliberal globalization after 1989, the dichotomy 'freedom –repression' is reshaped. On the one hand, thinking is considerably liberated, while the criteria and dimensions of the real globalization make it almost impossible to construct a specific hermeneutics of globalization. The neoliberal globalization has shaped a new 'society of the good will'. This honest and intensive identification with the own system was certainly the product of the message of the year 1989, a certain 'end of the history', which at a macro scale appeared as a model that was undoubtedly better than the previous one. This is not a detailed description of a real process, only an interpretation of a large historical arch: from the total identification (with the ideal new world) up to the manipulation (not yet quite totally realized), what started by the turning point of the collapse of the historical credibility of the new establishment through the year 2004 (George W. Bush's Iraq war) and/or of the year 2008 (World Financial Crisis). Do we come once to the new comprehensive and decisive manipulation of the 'society of the good will', which remained enthusiastic with the values of the year 1989? The novelty of this manipulation is that this time it is not aimed at the deprived, the wretched, the poor or social classes that should be appeased or diverted in the articulation of their real rights and disadvantages. This time some social classes are manipulated which are satisfied and identify themselves with the establishment, and also are satisfied with the current state of the world and globalization.*

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First of all, the conception applied in this study needs some explanation. Here we try to unite two different approaches. The first approach is theoretical-scientific, implemented by the author through the decades of his researches on the theoretical interpretation of globalization. This first approach is not quite disciplinary or paradigmatic, rather it is moving in the new waters of globalization research that appeared with the exigence of a theory building.

The other approach (and simultaneously practice) is however essayistic and includes personal notes. We think this approach is quite a necessity prescribed by the history, since the years 2015–2017 brought a range of new facts and configurations in the globalization processes which arouse also personal reactions and intellectual reflections. Afterwards, we are hardly mistaken in self-reflection because we think that these personal reflections are not really particular or subjective, but are articulated against the background of the long theoretical work. The most outstanding association should come from Karl Kraus, an orig-

inal thinker from Vienna of the pre-war period. Kraus often came to the idea: 'We are living in great epochs'!

In this exclamation Kraus associated the paradoxical simultaneous complexity and the as much pertinent impossibility of the *relationship between history and intellectuals*. Kraus's 'great epochs' are evidently anything but just 'great'. The simple reversal of the language is, however, not yet the solution itself. The "'great" epochs' are not 'great epochs'; however, in another sense they turn effectively 'great'. The cognitive dissonance becomes reality (the relation of disagreement is realizing), so that the elements of the once realized dissonance, however, come in a slightly wrong harmony ('however great epochs'). Moreover, the others are also coming: others think that these 'epochs are great', while it is also revealing that these epochs are precisely in this sense 'great', as such others take them for 'great', upon which the intellectual does not agree.

The contemporary world, in other words, the state of the present globalization, shows *two extremely rare and complex difficulties* that also start to impact many other domains. One of them is the problem of *understanding*, a kind of *hermeneutics* then, *i.e.* the problem that different individuals, normal actors and citizens of democracy (so strongly and quickly they can modify their conditions of existence) are hardly or not at all in the situation to understand the processes deploying, in the original sense of the word, in front of them.

To understand the present, and as said, the 'everyday' processes in the general sense of the word (it is then by no means about hermeneutic subtleties facing extremely complex facts), the usual actors of our time should realize the epoch which embraces an infinity of many small facets scattered all over the globe and spread in many languages and re-worked since the enormous quantity of informations is not at all comprehensible, and moreover, should be comprehended in the context of a diversity of old and new, known and still unknown ideologies. But it is not all.

One can quite rightly beforehand indicate (in the face of the vast hermeneutic necessities, 'anticipate'), that this *concrete* present, this *concrete* state of the globalization is existing in an extremely complex way; moreover, historically unprecedentedly, numerous facts are hidden behind the superficiality (partly *unintentionally* , because of the enormous extent of the informationtraffic, partly *willingly*, because of particular interests, partly, however, also because of the legal generosity of the largely established *personal rights*).

The concrete present is reproduced by numerous moments, facts and other complicated real processes, which go to meet the principles of the last thirty years. In this age (in order, with a certain simplification, to make clear this thesis, we would establish the start of this world-historical period in 1989), it was possible for a citizen of the world to identify himself also on a fairly long-term basis with the leading line of history. After long and cruel historical periods, this happened in those countries where this citizen of the world history had to resist the mainstream and where he could realize constantly his fundamental values with the biggest sacrifices and – it would not be moral to keep silent on the fact, that he often had to struggle for his pure survival.

After 1989, the possibility of the hope opened then in front of the citizen of the world, we will also later come back to this hope. A position of the good will, which one could be easily responsible for both intellectually and morally, a growing sensitivity and confidence in the once-found right way, which one should only take. One can only answer on the fact

that the nature of the power had also changed by means of a particular political-scientific thought process.

The *other, second* of the specific difficulties, mentioned at the beginning, of the description of the present state of the world (of the 'state of globalization') is also new, unprecedented and very difficult to categorize. It is about the 'splitting', 'cleavage', about the dichotomy that already became manifested and occurred in every society in the political realm of what we categorize as globalization. We are conscious of the specifically methodological difficulties.

Since we admit that, up to the years 2010, this specific dichotomy of political system of every individual society has certainly become reality, we should also debate of the diverse differences of the various 'splittings'. Since with regard to the comprehensibility of the today's globalization by the present global world citizens this political reality expressed in 'splitting' is largely similar; so we can renounce this comparison.

The 'splitting' is a fundamental feature of the political system of every democratic state. For long terms democracy can function considerably intact through splitting, 'two-party system', the distribution of political classes as well as of political opinions camps in two groups opposing to each other (which, in this situation, are no longer political parties but rather two living big units, like golems, whose struggle emerged and determined the political agenda). In its reality, it is also *symbolic*, so the phenomenon of splitting envisaged here has clearly dominated the domain during the presidential elections in the USA in 2016 between Hillary Clinton and Donald Trump.

It is not our job here to analyze further the phenomenon of this splitting in its genesis, reasons and consequences, it is sufficient for us to point out the tangible reality of this *cleavage*, and how this global and prevailing reality could obviously make affect the understanding of such incommensurable and unprecedented phenomena like globalization. Not only the phenomena, but also their theoretical character are then quite new, since we have now to do with how a political reality ('the splitting') can come to an epistemological dimension; 'splitting' prevents knowledge through its power of an effective domination in the political reproduction of a country and make the real conditions of globalization become visible behind the normative options of political splitting.

The cognitive catastrophe for a global citizen originates from the state of splitting through the fact that he was previously forced to choose one side or the other. Even in this choice intellectual and epistemological considerations are perfectly eliminated, for it would be truly astonishing, if we say that the system of the positions of one side of the political splitting would stand intellectually and epistemologically at the height of the human civilization, that this position would simply be identical to the right consciousness.

This choice between one pole and the other of the splitting has also other *diabolic* consequences. By choosing one pole, it is holistically evicted and excluded by the other. If one denies this choice, he then condemns himself thereby to the complete political solitude, one is excluded from politics, is accepted in the circle of the information circulation of no party.

Thus, in the global society a hitherto unprecedented *cleavage* occurs (said with the inevitable theoretical generalization). It is well noticeable that we have not yet formulated any statement about the global character of the 'splitting', or about its relations with globalization; so the understanding and interpretation of globalization within cognitive universe of a global citizen follows its course in a political *milieu*, which is penetrated by this

*cleavage* which – roughly said – from the beginning makes abort the political process of knowledge.

This colossal *Gran Canyon* should be chosen as object of particular investigations. This huge break line is undoubtedly a leading train of 'ontology' of globalization, without which its occurrence had to be immediately stipulated to globalization. It is precisely in this unfixed position between global ontology and political break line that the phenomenon of 'splitting' signals emerges in its real extent as well as a new global structure, which is no longer determined by the dichotomy of the world or by crucial and provocative existence of the communism. The free splitting of the real struggling social groups (or also parties) also leads to as well unprecedented phenomena in the fact, that this will represent with the same impulse, in numerous determining and not rarely immediately global questions, positions standing extremely strongly in opposition to each other.

There are numerous questions of a great scale: whether there is, or not, a climate change corresponding to the definitions, whether one must create jobs in the economical politics or must have recourse to 'outside sources', whether migrants are the enrichment of the spiritual substance of a nation or a natural catastrophe, whether oil still works or not, the same with the nuclear power plants, whether the drug means the death or the revolution of the school system, whether the geopolitics is legitimate or politically incorrect, whether the state-nations are existing or self-defining bodies.

It means then for the intellectual (communicative, ideological, value-orienting) world of globalization, that there are no longer any theoretical positions opposing to each other (that can be integrated without any difficulty in the global culture of the discussion), but two imperturbable centers which, from the beginning, have their position about all pertinent problems and consider the acceptance of this position as the condition of the appartenance to their political pole.

Thus, we arrived to the astonishing point of contact of both *extremely rare and complex difficulties* that stand in the way of the global world citizen in the way of the intellectual and cognitive in a breathtaking manner. It is in fact a situation that is not far at all from Karl Kraus' characterization, 'we live in great times'. *On the one side, we stated:* to understand the 'everyday' processes in the general sense of the word, the usual actors of our time should realize an age, that consists in an infinity of many small facets, becomes scattered throughout the whole globe, simultaneously runs and is constructed on many languages, is not comprehensible because of the enormous extent of informations, moreover, is conceptualized in the context of a variety of old and new, known and still unknown ideologies.

*On the other side, we stated:* it means for the intellectual (communicative, ideological, value-orienting) world of globalization that there are no longer any theoretical positions opposing to each other, but two imperturbable centers, which consider the acceptance of this position as the condition of the appartenance to their political pole.

It is clear, that the global citizen experiences a *real test*, he is standing in front of hardly solvable dilemmas, while the splitting makes considerably impossible to thematize or to deal with the dilemmas. Freedom and repression are again appearing in the form of new phenomena. While in the real socialism (to take only this example), thinking was liberated on all sides, it was only alluded to few 'taboos', which might only be judged in a single way.

In the neoliberal globalization after 1989, the dichotomy 'freedom-repression' is appearing in a new way. On the one side, the thinking is also in itself considerably liberated, while the criteria and dimensions of the real globalization are making almost impossible to construct a specific hermeneutics of globalization. Nothing is publicly made a taboo subject (the attempts of the 'politically correct' are going in this direction, but do not reach the degree of theoretical relevance). The considerably free thinking however comes in the purely 'external', one hundred per cent 'political' situation, if we want, to the 'political constraint' to accept the positions of one or another pole or to be politically and socially downgraded (in a 'free' society).

It is incredibly pertinent that the 'political constraint' of the global citizen, to abandon its freedom in favor of one or another pole, is distinguishing itself crucially from the 'structural constraint' or 'system constraint' of the real socialism, which restricted the freedom of his thought and formation of opinion through rules made a taboo subject. If Karl Kraus had experienced this real test in its true concrete form, he would probably also have been quickly recognized publicly in our days with the thesis 'about the great times'.

The everyday real test can be one of the major trains of character of the globalization of our years. If it represents an incarnated cognitive dissonance or an antinomy, or even a contradiction, which both poles are located on considerably different levels of abstraction, we leave that aside. While we want soon to describe the global society also as a '*society of the good will*', it is already so much clear, that 'the good will', which is mentioned here and not yet realized, a reaction also on the 'splitting' is worth of interest. If also other relations are linking this society with the represented real test ('infinite complexity – merciless splitting'), we can answer only at the end of this thought process.

After 1989, which date is, according to many considerations, also as the date of beginning of the globalization, it was given to the value-oriented and exigent men, to identify themselves with the democratic system and in it also, intensively and all-round, with their own democratic *establishment*. This honest and intensive identification with the own system was certainly the product of the message of the year 1989, a certain 'end of the history', that appeared in a macro-extent undoubtedly as a model, that was better than the previous one.

From a perspective of the increasing temporal distance, this phenomenon of the total identification with the own system reminds, with the best conscience, of phenomena of the sixties. It is here not about the peak points of the movement of the new Left, rather about the much slower change of values, in which many wanted to live value-oriented, have overcome positions of the new Left of that time, without wanting to have named themselves under the name of Left. This belongs also to the history of the invisible transition from the new Left to the neoliberalism, in other terms, from 1968 up to 1989, on which the author of these lines has also written a lot of studies, without having really thought at that time how much the thread of this transition was pertinent. Another important heuristic point in a possible reconstruction is that mysterious modification, of how finally similar contents are transformed, on the political pallet, from 'left' toward 'right'.

It is a fact, that this process of 1989 of the self-identification with the own system in the soul of this new group of citizens, wanting to live consciously value-orienting, was going on as it was the case after 1968. The movement of the big world-historical pendulum undoubtedly began already in the midst of the seventies (*i.e.* still far *before* 1989). This shows also the sense of the vacuum let by itself by the new Left (although we can still

hardly comprehend the diverse components of this process). Such a profound self-identification with the own society is for the own political representatives a 'social fact' in Emile Durkheim's sense which, as determining fact, must have and has also effectively a range of consequences. One of these consequences is that it can be an instrument suggesting to the power or to the *establishment* of such a society to manipulate this profound self-identification, this obvious confidence, to build on this attitude such as on a solid pillar in the political universe. The possibility of the manipulation is in principle spontaneous here, it is not necessarily provoked by situations of constraint of the concerned *establishments*. It is in principle also from the beginning so, that this intensity of the identification can hand over spontaneously the people concerned at any time to the manipulations of the *establishments*.

*This new master-servant relationship* spontaneously emerges immediately after the crystallization of the original basic situation, the best social order is here, without any reason to identify itself with joy; the social fact becomes reality. The year 1989 brought with it a credible message and a revolution of the good will. The big splitting integrated also this phenomenon of the new society of the good will. Do we come to a manipulation of the society of the good will, which remained with the values of the year 1989, then we have again to do with a quite new phenomenon; moreover, with a new phenomenon of a new nature.

The novelty of this manipulation is that this time it is not aimed at the deprived, the wretched, the poor or social classes that should be appeased or diverted in the articulation of their real rights and disadvantages; this time it is the manipulation of some classes, which are partially satisfied and identify themselves with the establishment, meanwhile being satisfied with the state of the world and globalization.

Here we present not a detailed description of a real process but only an interpretation of a large historical arch: *from the ideally accepted total identification* (with the new world) up to the *manipulation* (not yet quite totally realized), if we consider the turning point of the historical credibility of the new *establishment* of the year 2004 (George W. Bush's Iraq war) or of the year 2008 (world financial crisis). After such a turning point the necessity of manipulation also strongly increased.

The new freedom of the year 1989 meant an all-round freedom of the criticism. In the states of the late communism, it is well-obvious, that it was not different in the western states, over which the enthusiasm has also spread (even if today it is deliberately or not handed over to the oblivion). One of the realizations of the possibility of manipulation (of the new and specific master-servant relation), contained in the situation of the total self-identification, was that partly certain also spontaneous change, that the all-round criticism did not only remain impassible, but has become the symbol of the new world democracy. At the same time, we see that the essential criticism of the new political attitude no longer exists.

In order to make a judgement, we however do not forget, that the structurally, already for long, integrated Marxist criticism, has been at that time practically disqualified. We should also not forget, that the value-oriented attitude of the year 1989 was no longer considerably considering its own time as problematic, the positive, quite apologetic train was belonging to its nature. Moreover, the new culture of the all-round criticism has also not been supplemented by ever new rules of the correct behavior, by ever new rules of the correct speech, although precisely the society of the good will also spontaneously and inde-

pendently thought that, in 1989, a qualitative leap in the world history occurred. If one follows this line, one is soon confronted with well-known phenomena of the last decades.

*The result is striking:* in the criticism, already become of second nature, the share of 'empiricism' has always declined, although that of the criticism grew just as straightforwardly. A growing criticism with a shrinking share of empiricism is however only possible, if the proportion of manipulation also increases in the overall process. After the East-European real socialism and the West-European conformism (in a wider perspective, one must also add to this already the 'new' leftist conformism), we may by the way not be at all surprised, that the stabilization of the criticism as social activity produced a profound enthusiasm, which also led to the self-identification with the own reality, although (as we spoke about that as of a fundamental possibility) this *establishment* might also much recognize, that one can lean largely and perspectively upon this attitude.

It is not our job now to show in detail, which essential facts or processes cannot be lost in this universal culture of the criticism. This is the more profound reason of the already once mentioned proximity, if not encounter of the culture of the criticism and of the deconstruction issuing from the post-modernism. *On this line, manipulation is deconstruction and deconstruction manipulation.* Starting from the birth of a striking attitude which, on the basis of the interpretation of the year 1989, identified itself largely with the political and social (and global) institution of the new time, we draw up a hypothesis about three 'societies', that emerged from these sources. In this very hypothetic debate, we do not want exactly to sociologically describe these societies, we leave this page open, on which we however indicate that precisely the interpretation of the year 1989 produced these three global 'societies'. We take for absolutely actual the existence of these three global societies, even if we do not deal with the sociological description for instance on a meso-level.

The *first* society would be the society of the good will, already several times discussed, which very positive interpretation is once and for all characteristic and for which the value-oriented life of this year can no longer become an open problem. We define the *second* society provisionally as the one, which is fundamentally not constituted by the above described good will, without any regard to other definitions. More over, it becomes again clear, that this categorization does not rely on other sociological descriptions. In the following, we will try to identify it in this brief description as the society of the 'majority'.

We see the *third* society in that virtual apparatus, that political class or elite, and that global conglomeration, whose power has been built on the year 1989 and thus, became the concretization of that *establishment* with which the 'first' society identified itself so totally. This 'third' society might surely be defined on the basis of a detailed analysis also as 'a new class'; however on the one side we are not at all so far in the description, and on the other side, we are afraid that this 'new class' can be confused with the numerous other 'new' classes of the last historical period.

The three societies are making up a configuration, which surely does not fully constitute the sociological or political reality of the global period after 1989, which is however becoming apparent behind the relevant real events. The 'third' society is the object of the self-identification of the 'first', the 'first' is the product of the year 1989. The 'second' society lived after 1989 rather long in the shade, its emancipation began only after the first shakes of the new world order (under 'shakes', we understand mainly that process, in which the self-image and the expectations of the achievements of 1989 had to see themselves confronted to the reality).

We think beforehand, that the 'first' society, the one of the good will, of the culture of the criticism and of the individuality was representing on the long term, with the help of the 'third' society, but also spontaneously, the product of the world historical turn, *the whole* society. It is therefore a big question of the history and also of the civilization, of what was and, fundamentally, what does the historical fate of the 'second' society become, which is on the way to demonstrate the 'majority', while the 'third' society is doing everything to make an example out of the constantly changing groups of the 'first' society.

The relations of the three societies are produced in the milieu, which is defined by the reality of the indebted state. It can also hardly be different, because the indebted state is mainly the most profound definition of globalization. The 'third' society suggests often to the 'first' society, that the indebted state is not the relevant event or the relevant fact, rather that the dismantling of the state is a progress, that is precisely going to meet the individualizing and liberal velleities of the 'first' society. The 'second' society is, however, without any doubt the clear loser in the *condition humaine* of the indebted state.

For the *establishment* of the period after 1989, nothing might have been *in abstracto* more profitable than the weakness of the national sphere, which poured out of the indebtedness (and out of no other conditions). This *establishment* can appropriate itself everything in these circumstances! It can implement private power plants and private universities, it can buy media or media empires, and it is also largely free from any further state control (because of globalization, of the media power, and exaggerated personal rights, that grant this class a practically unshakable legal Protection).

In the co-ordinated interplay of the 'first' and the 'third' societies, the 'second' society appears constantly and really without the details of a certain situation, as 'an enemy'. It has to be seen so, because for instance the 'third' society cannot at all imagine that this society will bear its deprivation, impoverishment and social humiliation without any resistance. For precisely the 'third' society knows most exactly which profits of any kind it has already drawn from this change, and it remains nothing but the 'first' class to believe in the interpretation models of the 'third' society about the nature of the 'second' society. *So then it remains a simple task of an everyday manipulation.*

The three 'societies' are living amongst others also in the world of the new medias. The communication, the knowledge, the technology of information, the world of the virtuality enable such an all-round, wide and rapid exchange of messages and informations, so that a complete empirical investigation becomes impossible. This is a kind of 'end of empiricism', whereby the change in the form of mediatization makes no longer possible to reconstruct 'empiricism' as empiricism.

The three 'societies' can be excellently characterized and classified on the axis of the media poverty and media wealth. The 'third' society owns the mediality in every sense of the word. It uses the media to preserve with it (with the 'third' society) the 'first' society in its enthusiasm and complete self-identification. The 'second' society is not considered as a target group, has itself no media, appears in the media for instance as a 'victim' or as a 'potential danger' (it is, of course, only a shortcut). So we have in front of us the most important trains of manipulation, it is kept alive by the 'third' class in the interests of a further mastering the 'first' class. If we enquire at this point again about the reasons, why this manipulation is so successful, why a culture of the criticism exists without empiricism, so we must have again recourse to the downfall of the Marxism.

In this context Marxism does not play any primary political or ideological role. The current situation shows that the Marxism, independently from its acceptance, had a kind



of ontological meaning, also among those, who did not share it. The rapid disappearance of the relevant empiricism from the culture of the criticism clearly signals this context. The 'three' societies are not necessarily developing in their parallelism in the political direction in the sense, that they once appear in a representative state as three vast big parties. It seems that they are evolving in the direction of three great thought communities, for instance, toward three 'religions' in a not yet exactly identified sense of the word. Fully roughly outlined: the 'first' society goes in the sense of a new and of a new type Christianity ('Man is good'), the 'second' society is wrapping around a new 'religion', while it wants to escape the chaos of the new mass culture and of the old resentment. Today, we already know the 'religion' of the 'third' society: it is 'Monte Carlo', 'Alfa Romeo', 'Cayman Island' and 'Kalashnikov'.

The status of distribution of the media ownership (and its ever-talented use) precisely underlines the importance of *Assange* and *Snowden*, this situation creates precisely the right context for their publications. Philosophically expressed, in a culture of the criticism, where the empiricism is missed out, the billions of informations that it makes public should strive for a balance. This revolution of the empiricism shook the credibility of the 'third' society. The 'first' society can free itself from the enchantment of the 'third' society. The 'second' society can breathe deeply, but still has much to suffer until it succeeds in articulating itself positively.

*The designed 'three societies' make a new ether for interpretation of the existing global world society.* They do not replace any 'empirical sociology', nor any other legitimate discipline (such as 'international politics' or 'political theory'). They provide a new opportunity for the description of the global reality, *in a certain analogy to the natural descriptions of our days*; here we should point that one description does not make superficial or deny the others, and every description refers to its truth content from the definitions of its perspectivistic peculiarity. It seems, nevertheless, that this ether of the three new 'classes', as we repeat it, is already on the way to play a perceptible empirical role in the reconstruction of the current world society.

It is easy to notice how the deepest debates, or directly the deepest struggles of our times are concentrated around the basic elements of this virtual and abstract class formation. One can identify how the class of the 'manipulators' (roughly named the elite) uses its most important forces to support the pure existence of this class (*i.e. its own existence!*). *Assange's* and *Snowden's* previously mentioned meaning is rooted in this reality. One can also clearly identify that another global struggle is led to present the 'class of the good will' *as the real majority* in front of the public which opposes only marginal groups the latter largely do not recognize the fundamental bases of the year 1989. One can, however, also perceive this profound struggle which is oriented to the fact that the third big class (whose primary characteristic is that it does not share the 'good will' of the second class) precisely does not exist in this coherence and in this common constitution, so that it can by no means carry the attribute 'majority'. Therefore, no wonder, that the new formations formed in this third big group do everything to stylize themselves as the representatives of the 'majority', eventually of the 'new' majority, but at least of the 'impeccably democratic' majority.

*A possible positioning of the current Left* among these three large virtual groups (which, as we have said, also slowly assume empirical trains) designates, however, the orientation of the empirical realization. This positioning might explain much of the contemporary real

politics. For, *on the one hand*, after 2000 the established Left belongs to the class of the ‘manipulators’ (*i.e.* the elite). *On the other hand*, the established Left builds without any doubt a strong and independent group of the ‘society of the good will’. And *thirdly*, the ‘third class’ also remains (*i.e.*, the ‘majority’) which was traditionally considered as ‘left target group’. This tripartition of the real existing Left might also explain, why its political articulation is so fragmented. If we were to consider the phenomenon *Trump* or the alternatives of the current moderated and/or extreme rights in front of the horizon of this new virtual structure, this confrontation would then yield numerous insights.

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